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ARBITRATION OF JUST CAUSE CLAIMS BENEFITS
EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES
Stacy A. Hickox

ABSTRACT
Employees with disabilities typically rely on the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) for protection against discipline or discharge.
Arbitration has been viewed with suspicion by civil rights advocates based
on concerns that arbitrators will not adequately protect the rights of
employees in disadvantaged groups, including those with disabilities. This
review of arbitration awards that determine whether an employer had just
cause to discharge or discipline employees with disabilities shows that such
suspicion may be unwarranted. Under just cause protection, employers carry
the burden of justifying a discharge, as well as providing notice of conduct
standards and adhering to past practice. In addition, arbitrators applying a
just cause provision will consider other advantageous contractual protections
as well as mitigating circumstances in reviewing both the justification for the
discharge and the appropriateness of discharge as the employer’s response.
These characteristics of arbitrating just cause claims can benefit employees
with disabilities beyond the relief available under the ADA.
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INTRODUCTION
People with disabilities continue to struggle to find and retain
employment.1 Even if a person with a disability is hired, their position in the
workforce has been described as “at best, precarious.”2 An employer may
not be aware of the disability at the time of hire, or the disability may arise
or worsen after hire. Consequently, an employer may find reason to
discharge an employee based on biases or stereotypes associated with the
disability, or the impact of the impairment on the person’s performance,
attendance, or workplace safety. Employees typically turn to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) to challenge a discharge based on their
disability, which may include invocation of an affirmative obligation to
provide reasonable accommodation that may provide an employee with
additional protection against discharge. Some have expressed concern that
if an employee with a disability is required to arbitrate claims related to her
dismissal, she will lose out on protections against discrimination, particularly
those included in the ADA. This review of 160 arbitration awards shows
that just cause provisions, whether under a collective bargaining agreement
or an exception to employment at will, provide employees with disabilities
with significantly more protection than the ADA alone provides.
This analysis of the benefits of just cause protection for employees with
disabilities is important for several reasons. First, a comparison of these
awards to outcomes in analogous ADA decisions helps to answer the
question of whether arbitrators are adequately equipped to resolve claims
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE A-6. EMPLOYMENT
STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BY SEX, AGE, AND DISABILITY STATUS, NOT
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (2017).
2. Carrie Basas, A Collective Good: Disability Diversity as a Value in Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 793, 799, 801 (2013).
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that would otherwise arise under the ADA and other non-discrimination
statutes. Courts regularly defer to arbitration as the forum to enforce
statutory rights as well as contractual rights.3 This deference is based on the
assumptions that arbitrators are “capable of handling the difficult factual and
legal issues that might be raised in a discrimination claim,” and that
arbitration “would not interfere with the fair resolution of employment
discrimination claims.”4 In contrast to these assumptions, others have
warned that arbitration of statutory claims would result in statutes like the
ADA becoming “dead letters for unionized employees.”5 This analysis of
just cause claims by employees with disabilities tests the viability of
arbitration as an alternative venue to resolve discrimination claims, as
compared to just cause claims by employees without disabilities and
analogous claims resolved by the courts under the ADA.
Just cause protection can result from the coverage of a collective
bargaining agreement or from protections extended by an employer as an
exception to employment at will. In either circumstance, just cause
protections will likely be first interpreted and applied by an arbitrator. One
general advantage of relying on just cause protection rather than the ADA
alone stems from the long-recognized dilemma faced by any ADA plaintiff
to show that she has a disability, i.e., a substantial limitation of a major life
activity, but at the same time remains qualified to perform the essential job
duties of her position.6 Under a just cause provision, a grievant need not
prove that she has a disability as defined by the ADA; instead, the employee
can simply present evidence showing a lack of just cause by establishing her
ability to perform the job if reasonable accommodations are provided.
Some also argue that just cause protection leads employers to avoid
hiring “risky” employees, thus adversely affecting people who are protected
against but most vulnerable to discrimination.7 Since this risk aversion
behavior could extend to employees with disabilities identified during the
hiring process, it is important to examine whether the just cause protection
provides a benefit to employees with disabilities that would justify this
3. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270-74 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991).
4. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration
of Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
861, 869 (2010).
5. Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett:
Letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 975, 984 (2010).
6. Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
GA. L. REV. 27, 102-03 (2000).
7. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 97 (2007).
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otherwise potentially adverse effect on them during the hiring process.
This review of arbitration awards also demonstrates how some general
principles applied to the interpretation of just cause provisions can benefit
employees with disabilities. First, the placement of the burden of proving
just cause on the employer can have a significant impact on the outcome of
the challenge to an employee’s discharge. In contrast, an ADA plaintiff
carries the burden to establish that she is a person with a disability but that
she was also otherwise qualified to perform the duties of the position at the
time of her discharge, and that any accommodation is reasonable.
Beyond the burden of proof, certain characteristics inherent in the
arbitration of just cause claims can have significant benefits for employees
with disabilities. First, general requirements that an employee be provided
with notice of required and prohibited behavior as well as an expectation that
the discharge should align with the employer’s past practice can benefit an
employee with a disability. Second, an arbitrator interpreting a just cause
provision will consider other contractual obligations on an employer in
deciding whether the discharge of an employee with a disability was
justified. Beyond specific contractual requirements, an arbitrator may also
consider an employer’s more general interests or aggravating circumstances
that might support a finding of just cause, but an employee with a disability
also benefits from an arbitrator’s consideration of mitigating circumstances.
A showing of just cause may be undermined by the link between the
employee’s disability and the reason for the discharge, as well as
consideration of the employee’s other characteristics, such as longevity with
the employer.
Lastly, this review of arbitration awards considers the benefits of
flexibility in fashioning the remedies in an award interpreting a just cause
provision. A court interpreting the ADA is limited to the question of whether
the employer discriminated, and if so, whether reinstatement, back pay and
other damages should follow.8 In contrast, an arbitrator applying a just cause
provision can change a discharge to a suspension, or award reinstatement
without back pay, where the grievant is somewhat at fault but the employer
lacked just cause for her discharge. In addition, an arbitrator can order
various conditions or requirements on the employee seeking reinstatement,
which can help resolve an employer’s concerns about the grievant’s return
to work. Thus, this review demonstrates that arbitration of claims under a
just cause standard can benefit employees with disabilities in ways that they
would never enjoy under the ADA.
8. For example, EEOC’s 2016 report shows $131 million in monetary damages, but
does not report on the number of reinstatements or other nonmonetary settlements. U.S.
EQUAL EMPL’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA)
CHARGES (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) (2016).
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BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT

Over its 25-year span, the ADA has been disappointing in its impact on
employment opportunities for people with disabilities. Studies have found
that the passage of the ADA led to a decrease in employment of people with
disabilities, compared to the employment of nondisabled men.9 The labor
force participation rate for persons with a disability was 21.0% in October
2017, compared to a participation rate of 68.3% for people without a
disability;10 likewise, people with disabilities average an unemployment rate
of 11.5%, compared to an unemployment rate of 4.7% among persons with
no disability.11 Labor force participation rates for individuals with certain
disabilities, such as mental illness, are even lower.12 Likewise, the
unemployment rates for people with a disability (9.1%) are almost three
times higher than unemployment rates (averaging 3.8%) for the non-disabled
with similar disparities across all educational attainment groups.13
Employers may be reluctant to hire people with disabilities for a variety
of reasons, including the expected cost of accommodations, a lack of
awareness as to how to deal with employees with disabilities, and the fear of
potential litigation by employees who are later disciplined or discharged.14
Other slightly less common reasons for failing to retain people with
disabilities include concerns over the need for more extensive supervision,
other additional costs, as well as unreliable performance and attendance.15
Along with these work-related concerns, attitudes and discrimination are the
most frequently reported barriers to inclusion of disabled people in the
workplace; in fact, many disability rights advocates believe that negative
social attitudes underlie the disproportionate unemployment and under-

9. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001); Thomas
DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 693, 694 (2000).
10. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Statistics, supra note 1.
11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TABLE A. EMPLOYMENT
STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN AND NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY DISABILITY STATUS AND
AGE, 2015 AND 2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES (2017), available at https://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/disabl.a.htm [https://perma.cc/2VHB-XW9C].
12. Judith A. Cook, Employment Barriers for Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities:
Update of a Report for the President’s Commission, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1391, 139192 (2006).
13. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-17-0857, PERSONS
WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS – 2016 (2017).
14. H. Stephen Kaye et al., Why Don’t Employers Hire and Retain Workers with
Disabilities?, 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 526, 528-29 (2011).
15. Id.
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employment of people with disabilities.16
The ADA was enacted in large part to improve the labor market
participation of people with disabilities and to address some of these barriers
to employment.17 Unfortunately, the ADA has not been particularly
successful in achieving these goals. While some have disputed whether the
ADA’s adoption had a direct negative effect on the employment
opportunities of people with disabilities,18 as outlined above, there is no
question that barriers to employment continue to exist for this group. One
reason for the ADA’s lack of positive impact stems from the fact that
plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in litigation against employers to
enforce their rights under the ADA, with win rates as low as 3%.19 This lack
of success mirrors plaintiffs’ difficulty in successfully litigating any
employment–related claim, in which only about 5% of claims proceed to trial
(as opposed to pre-trial dismissal or settlement), and less than 30% of claims
proceeding to trial result in a judgment for the employee.20 In comparison,
employees’ win rates in mandatory arbitration are estimated at about 21%.21
As Justice Harry Edwards has noted, an employee claiming discrimination
is better off in arbitration because the process is quicker, less costly, and
lacks the procedural barriers of the courts.22
For this reason, this paper explores the potential for just cause
protection to advance the interests of employees with disabilities. The role
of just cause protection for employees with disabilities has received little

16. Sally Lindsay, Discrimination and Other Barriers to Employment for Teens and
Young Adults with Disabilities, 33 DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION 1340, 1341 (2011).
17. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme
Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522,
522 (2008).
18. Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of
Disability Discrimination 3, 20-23 (Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper No. 106, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=580741 [https://perma.cc/DFK4-CA8Y].
19. Amy L. Albright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I – Survey
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007); Sharona Hoffman,
Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 306 (2008).
20. Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 4, 11 (2015).
21. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS,
Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #414 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/thearbitration-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/6KWZ-UBLT]. Mandatory arbitration procedures
have become increasingly popular since 1991. See id. (listing major corporations using
mandatory arbitration procedures).
22. Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a
Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982, CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 16, 24 (James L. Stern & Barbara D.
Dennis eds., 1983).
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attention in literature on arbitration or the advancement of the rights of those
employees. For example, in a treatise of over 500 pages on just cause, only
five pages are devoted to reasonable accommodations for the employees with
disabilities.23 This paper highlights the role that arbitration of just cause
claims can play in advancing the employment opportunities of people with
disabilities.
II. JUST CAUSE PROTECTION
The resolution of just cause claims through arbitration has significant
potential to benefit employees with disabilities. Compared to a court or a
unilateral decision by an employer, an arbitrator arguably can consider the
interests of both the employer and the employee with a disability in
reviewing both the basis for the discipline and potential changes in the
workplace to improve future performance. At the same time, the rights of
employees with disabilities could be severely diminished, given the Supreme
Court’s deference to arbitration, if arbitrators cannot or will not appropriately
apply both contractual rights and the ADA to claims invoking just cause
protection.
Just cause has been criticized as “difficult for employers to prove,”
making the resolution process inefficient and vulnerable to second-guessing
of the employer’s business decisions by the arbitrator.24 Some have argued
that employers spend “large sums of money” to resolve just cause claims in
arbitration; in the alternative, employers offer “large, and often undeserved,
severance payments” or even retain unproductive employees.25 Economists
have shown that exceptions to employment at-will, including just cause
protection, are associated with an increase of labor expenses and have a
negative effect on profitability, just as wrongful-discharge laws impose costs
on employers.26
Without just cause protection, the presumption of employment at-will
means that “many truly egregious terminations are left unremedied.”27 The
employment-at-will doctrine can result in “substantial levels of uncertainty
for employers and employees alike.”28 At-will employees who have been
23. ADOLPH M. KOVEN & SUSAN L. SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 421-26 (BNA
ed., 3d ed. 2006).
24. Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 64 (2008).
25. Id.
26. Robert C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Wrongful-Discharge Laws Impair Firm
Performance?, 52 J. L. & ECON. 197, 218 (2009).
27. Porter, supra note 25, at 63.
28. Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the Common Law: Towards a Renewed
Prominence for Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge Jurisprudence, 24 B.Y.U. J.
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discharged are left to rely on anti-discrimination statutes, including the
ADA,29 leading to an over-reliance on these statutes to protect against unjust
discharges.30
The impact of just cause protection illustrates both its benefits for
employees and its role in reducing uncertainty for both employers and
employees. These arguments in favor of some form of just cause protection
have led to widespread adoption of just cause provisions in collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs)31 as well as some voluntary incorporation of
exceptions to employment at-will in employer policies and procedures.
Under either a CBA or an employer policy, just cause protection is often
accompanied by a mandatory arbitration program.32 The potential for
protecting employees with disabilities under a just clause provision may
explain the observation that allegations of disability discrimination are
presented in the grievance and arbitration system more often than other
forms of discrimination.33 For this reason, it is important to understand what
is meant by just cause and how such protection is adopted as part of a CBA
or arises as an exception to employment at-will.
A. What is Just Cause?
The just cause standard has been characterized as “inexact,”34 and at
least one arbitrator has noted that it “cannot be seen in an absolute sense.”35
A determination of whether an employer had just cause to discharge an
employee depends upon numerous factors related to both the specific event
leading to the discharge and the length and quality of the employee’s work
record, as well as the circumstances surrounding the promulgation and past
enforcement of the policy in question.36 Just cause analysis allows for review
of the appropriateness of discharge as the penultimate level of discipline, in
that a penalty must not be excessive, and must be corrective or progressive
unless the conduct justifies discharge for a first offense.37
PUB. L. 193, 194 (2010).
29. Steven E. Abraham, The Arizona Employment Protection Act: Another “Wrongful
Discharge Statute” That Benefits Employers?, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 105 (2008).
30. Porter, supra note 25, at 76.
31. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, at 7, 127
(14th ed. 1995) (discussing grounds for discharge and prohibitions on discrimination).
32. For further explanation, see infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
33. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 423.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Indal Aluminum Gulfport, 84 Lab. Arp. Rep. (BNA) 124, 127 (1985) (Nicholas,
Arb.).
36. THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS 184-187
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
37. Id.
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A review of arbitration awards, which apply just cause provisions and
sometimes applicable statutes to employees with disabilities, demonstrates a
wide variation in how much the ADA influences how just cause is
interpreted. Just cause protections against discipline and discharge are
commonly found in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) as well as
some employee handbooks. Arbitration awards apply just cause protections
based on traditional contract interpretation principles as well as arbitrators’
interpretations of applicable statutes, where the arbitrator has the authority
and the inclination to apply them. The outcomes in these awards often
compare favorably to judicial outcomes under various nondiscrimination and
other protective statutes.
This analysis will help to answer the question of whether barriers to
continued employment can be addressed through collective bargaining and
arbitration. More broadly, this review will illustrate whether arbitrators are
equipped to resolve grievances so as to help remove barriers to continued
employment for employees with disabilities and other barriers to
employment while still interpreting and applying the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and union.
1. Just Cause in CBAs
Just cause protection against discipline or discharge is one of the most
widely recognized benefits of representation by a labor union in the United
States.38 As of 2011, nearly 16.3 million employed workers were covered
by CBAs,39 most of which require just cause for discipline or discharge, and
provide for interpretation of that protection through a grievance process and
final adjudication before a neutral arbitrator.40 Such protection creates an
important exception to employment at-will for employees who are covered
by a CBA. Some arbitrators recognize protection from unjust dismissal even
in contracts that do not contain an explicit “just cause” provision, because
such protection is so integral to the collective bargaining relationship.41 One
38. See KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 15-17 (describing the role of just cause in
collective bargaining relationship).
39. See Mario F. Bognanno, et al., The Conventional Wisdom of Discharge Arbitration
Outcomes and Remedies: Fact or Fiction, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 153, 153-54
(2014) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov.proxy2.cl.m
su.edu/cps/cpsaat40.htm [https://perma.cc/4HS7-325D]).
40. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 32, at 7, 127 (discussing discharge
procedures and prohibitions on discrimination).
41. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS (The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., 5th ed. 1997) at 886-87; see, e.g., J & J Maint., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 847, 855 (2005) (Henderson, Arb.) (showing presence of an arbitration clause is an
important event pointing toward implicit “just cause” protection); Superior Prods., 116 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1623, 1626 (2002) (Hockenberry, Arb.); Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 114 Lab.
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arbitrator went so far as to state that a failure to recognize an implied just
cause protection would be “unconscionable,” even where the employer has
reserved discretion to impose discipline; without it, employers would hold
“an unlimited right to decide any issue concerning employees’ job security
without a challenge,” thereby compromising “the integrity of the bargaining
unit,” and would “nullify the seniority and arbitration provisions, and, of
course, make a mockery of the no strike clause.”42
Despite the importance of just cause protection, employers can
sometimes preserve the employment at-will relationship with “clear contract
language” or based on “unequivocal bargaining history or past practice, . . .
[or] the special nature of employment” demonstrating the intent of the
parties.43 Only such “high degree of assurance about intent” will cause an
arbitrator to “bypass the fairness doctrines associated with the just-cause
principle.”44 Thus, despite its commonality, just cause protection will not be
implied where the contract language specifically preserves the at-will
employment relationship.45
The widespread inclusion of just cause protection in CBAs suggests that
both employers and unions value its role. Such protection produces an
economically efficient outcome if unionized employees are more willing to
pay for such protection than employers are willing to pay for an at-will
relationship.46 The efficiency and overall attractiveness of just cause
protection for an employer and union may depend upon the composition of
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 358, 358 (2000) (Kaufman, Arb.) (demonstrating that an employer must
prove that it had just cause to discharge non-probationary employees); Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep.(BNA) 609, 611 (1993) (Feldman, Arb.) (noting arbitrators
overwhelmingly imply cause or just cause in the absence of clear and unambiguous language
that such a standard is not to be considered); Zellerbach Paper Co., 73 Lab. Arb. Rep.(BNA)
1140, 1142 (1979) (Sabo, Arb.) (“[E]ven where a contract fails to include any general
limitations as to the right to [d]ischarge, [a]rbitrators have concluded that a just cause
restriction is implied in modern Collective Bargaining Agreements . . . .”); Gary Minda &
Katie R. Raab, Time For an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137,
1192-93 (1989) (“[I]f a just cause clause is missing from the agreement, the arbitrator infers
its existence from the seniority clause or grievance and arbitration provision.”); Kenneth A.
Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment Termination
Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 910 (1994) (“[M]any arbitrators have inferred the existence of a
just-cause standard in agreements that did not expressly state such a standard.”).
42. See Theole Asphalt, 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 953, 957 (2011) (Baroni, Arb.)
(explaining that just cause for discipline is an integral part of agreements, unless specifically
disclaimed).
43. J & J Maint., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 855.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1117, 1123 (2016) (Baroni,
Arb.) (refusing to imply just cause protection where contract language specifically preserved
the at-will employment relationship).
46. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. REV.
89, 89, 95 (2008).
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the workforce and the sense of whether statutory protections are sufficient
for those employees. The value of just cause protection highlights the
important role that labor unions can take in advancing the interests of
workers with disabilities in particular, by bargaining for and arbitrating just
cause challenges to discharges and other forms of discipline.47
2. Just Cause as Employment At Will Exception
Just cause protections can be seen as an exception to the general
presumption that employees in the U.S. are “at-will,” meaning that the
relationship can be terminated by either party at any time for any reason or
no reason.48 This means that employees are “vulnerable to arbitrary and
sudden dismissal.”49 In large part because the employment contract is
typically governed by state law, standards related to discharge have been
characterized as “numerous, complex, and unnecessarily confusing.”50 This
makes compliance and enforcement difficult for employers, which is
troubling given the importance of discharges for both employers and
employees.51 This variability and instability arguably has introduced “a
considerable measure of ambiguity and inefficiency into the American labor
market, both for employers and employees,” which is only exacerbated by
higher levels of discharges as in a recession.52
Employers can create an exception to employment at will via a CBA or
through its own policies by including just cause protection.53 Most states
will enforce promises in an employee handbook that create an exception to
employment at will,54 with only six states failing to recognize any such

47. See Stacy A. Hickox, Bargaining for Accommodations, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 147, 195203 (2016) for further discussion of the benefits of addressing accommodation in contract
negotiations.
48. Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms,
Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L. J. 84, 84 (2007).
49. Id.
50. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 95.
51. Id.
52. Coley, supra note 29, at 196.
53. Stone, supra note 49, at 89. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292
N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (“[W]here an employer chooses to establish [personnel]
policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship
is presumably enhanced.”).
54. Bloomberg BNA Individual Employment Rights Law (Analysis), State Rulings
Chart, http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lerc/2441/split_display.ad
p?fedfid=2161694&vname=leiermana&fcn=1&wsn=500060000&fn=2161694&split=0;
see, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that the employment at-will principle did not apply when the company had issued a detailed
employee handbook containing specific grievance procedures).
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exception.55 To be enforceable, courts typically require that language
offering just cause protection must be specific, clear and unequivocal.56 Of
course a disclaimer or other language in an employee handbook can negate
the binding effect of a just cause provision.57
55. Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); McConnell v. E. Air
Lines, Inc., 499 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Burgess v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 345 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975); Stanton v. Tulane Univ. of La., 777 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Johnson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
56. See generally Conley v. Bd. of Trs. of Grenada Cty. Hosp., 707 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.
1983); Zavadil v. Alcoa Extrusions Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D.S.D. 2005); Smith v.
Heritage Salmon, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 208 (D. Me. 2002); Caucci v. Prison Health Servs.,
Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Hoerner v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 98 Civ. 4210,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2914 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hines v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F.
Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Milroy v. K-G Retail Stores, 819 F. Supp. 857 (D. Neb. 1993);
Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen.
Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989); DeMasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999);
Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501 (Ark. 1987); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Cal. 2000); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo.
1988); Finley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 499 A.2d 64 (Conn. Ct. App. 1985), rev’d on other
grounds, 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987); Sisco v. GSA Nat’l Capital Fed. Credit Union, 689
A.2d 52 (D.C. 1997); Kinoshita v. Can. Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986); Watson v.
Idaho Falls Consol. Hosp., Inc., 720 P.2d 632 (Idaho 1986); Janda v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 961
N.E.2d 425, 440 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa
1990); Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 815 P.2d 72 (Kan. 1991); Dahl v.
Brunswick Corp., 356 A.2d 221 (Md. 1976); Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d
975 (Mass. 1988); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980); Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 2000); Martin v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 899 P.2d 551 (Nev. 1995); Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 629 A.2d 91 (N.H.
1993); Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1994); Forrester v. Parker, 606
P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980); Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986);
Osterman-Levitt v. MedQuest, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 70 (N.D. 1994); Mers v. Dispatch Printing
Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100 (Ohio 1985); Russell v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 952 P.2d 492 (Okla.
1997); Frazier v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 728 P.2d 87 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); King v.
PYA/Monarch, 453 S.E.2d 885 (S.C. 1995); Smith v. Morris, 778 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988); City of Odessa v. Barton, 967 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 1998); Francisconi v. Union Pac.
R.R., 36 P.3d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 2001); Taylor v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466 (Vt.
1993); Ludwig v. T2 Med., Inc., 34 Va. Cir. 65 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1994); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986);
Garvey v. Buhler, 430 N.W.2d 616 (Wis. 1988); Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385
(Wyo. 1985).
57. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-110 (2017) (“It is the public policy of this State
that a handbook . . . shall not create an express or implied contract of employment if it is
conspicuously disclaimed.”); Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d 615, 622-23 (S.D.
2006) (finding “an explicit contractual reservation of the statutory power to terminate an
employee at will” when the employment contract states that an employer has the right to
terminate employment at any time); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003
(Utah 1991) (finding against the employee when the manual in question contains clear and
conspicuous language stating the employer’s intent to maintain an at-will relationship); Suter
v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751, 754 (W. Va. 1991) (“[T]he court made it clear that
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Some states’ legislation has recognized the enforceability of a contract
creating an exception to employment at will,58 and Montana has legislated
good cause protection for all employees not covered by a CBA or a term
contract.59 However, even Montana’s statute requiring a “legitimate
business reason” for discharge has been defined broadly to include “a reason
that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and [has] . . . some
logical relationship to the needs of the business.”60
An employer may indirectly provide its employees with just cause
protection by its adoption of an employment arbitration program.61
Employment arbitration clauses have become increasingly common.62 A
mandate to arbitrate disputes between the employer and employee can be
viewed as an exception to employment at will.63 Some employment
arbitrators, when hearing claims by individual employees, have found an
implied just cause test where the employer has provided an arbitration
system to resolve employment disputes.64 Thus, if an employment
agreement includes a just cause protection against discipline or discharge,
that agreement may be enforceable through an arbitration system. If,
however, the employer has explicitly preserved its right to discharge
employees without cause, an arbitrator will be unlikely to imply a just cause
requirement.65
Even if an employer incorporates some just cause provision into its
employment contracts, its effectiveness in protecting the interests of

employers could protect themselves by requiring prospective employees to acknowledge that
they served at the will and the pleasure of the employer.”); Davis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., 934 P.2d
1246 (Wyo. 1997).
58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-1501 (LexisNexis 2017) (establishing the enforceability of
contract clauses expressly restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment
relationship).
59. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-902 (2017).
60. Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 538, 540 (Mont. 1991).
61. Koven & Smith, supra note 23, at 31-32.
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
63. Stone, supra note 49, at 85.
64. See, e.g., Essroc Materials, 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 664, 668 (1992) (Murphy,
Arb.) (“[I]t is reasonable to imply into the text of [a] special procedure [for discharge] that the
Employer had ‘just cause’ in order to justify its decision to discharge.”); Alfred M. Lewis,
Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 621, 624 (1983) (Sabo, Arb.) (“Arbitrators have concluded
that a Just Cause restriction is implied in modern Collective Bargaining Agreements in the
absence of a provision to the contrary.”).
65. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 31. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs. v.
Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 194-95 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an arbitration agreement retains
employer’s ability to discharge at will when expressly stated); Local Union 1393 v. Utils.
Dist. of W. Ind. Rural Elec. Membership Coop., 167 F.3d 1181, 1185 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding
no implied just cause requirement when the CBA expressly provides the employer with the
sole discretion and final authority to terminate).
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employees may be limited if left to the courts for interpretation. For
example, a Wisconsin court determined that even though a hospital had
agreed to discharge an employee only if the discharge was in the hospital’s
best interest, the court would not delve into the reasonableness of the
decision or whether the reasons existed in fact, but limited itself to the
question of whether the hospital believed that the discharge was in its own
interest.66 As outlined immediately below, courts also show significant
deference to arbitrators’ interpretations of just cause provisions.
B. Judicial Deference to Arbitration Awards
When considering the role of arbitration in supporting the rights of
employees with disabilities, it is important to consider the longstanding
limitations of the courts in reviewing arbitrators’ awards. Judicial deference
to arbitration awards occurs in determinations as to whether the employer
had just cause to impose discipline or discharge under either a CBA67 or an
individual arbitration agreement.68
Judicial deference extends to an arbitrator’s determination that an
arbitration agreement suggests an implied just cause standard. An
66. Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. Ass’n, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
67. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 682 v. Thoele Asphalt Paving, Inc., 508
Fed. Appx. 583, 583 (8th Cir. 2013); SFIC Properties, Inc. v. Machinists, Dist. Lodge 94, 103
F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that just cause requirements are inferred from all
modern day CBA’s which do not contain an express provision); Truck Drivers Local 705 v.
Schrider Tank Lines, 958 F.2d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that an arbitration clause
implies a just cause requirement); Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir.
1983) (“In instances where the language of a collective contract does not explicitly prohibit
dismissal except for just cause, arbitrators typically infer such prohibitions from seniority
clauses or grievance and arbitration procedures.”); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., v. Liang,
653 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It has been held repeatedly that an agreement to arbitrate
disputes about employee discharges implies a requirement that discharges be only for ‘just
cause.’”); McCall v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 3:08-cv-2000-M, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2522 at
*30 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2010) (“[T]he fact that the CBA allows arbitration of employee
terminations implies a requirement that discharges be only for ‘just cause.’”); United Food
and Commercial Workers Int’l v. Gold Star Sausage, 487 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. 1980) (finding
that the arbitrator is allowed to find that the CBA implied a just cause requirement); see also
Minda & Raab, supra note 42, at 1192-93 (“[I]f a just cause clause is missing from the
agreement, the arbitrator infers its existence from the seniority clause or grievance and
arbitration provision.”); Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499-500 (1976) (noting that arbitrators typically infer
just cause protections from seniority clauses or grievance and arbitration procedures).
68. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
arbitrator’s ruling that discharge was unjustified even though employee was at-will under state
law); Deluca v. Bear Stearns & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that
the arbitrator could find just cause requirement based on arbitration agreement, employee
handbook, practices and statements by management).
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arbitrator’s implication of just cause as part of an arbitration agreement has
been upheld even in an “at will” state, because the use of arbitration to settle
employment-related disputes “necessarily alters the employment
relationship from at-will to something else — some standard of discernable
cause is inherently required in this context where an arbitration panel is
called on to interpret the employment relationship.”69 The Eight Circuit
explained that if the arbitration procedure did not change the employee’s atwill status, “the arbitration procedure designed to interpret that employment
relationship would serve no identifiable purpose.”70
Even though an employer, a union or an individual employee can seek
to negate an arbitrator’s award in court, the Federal Arbitration Act limits
judicial review of arbitration awards to instances “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”71 A
court will not “reconsider the merits of an award[,] even though the parties
may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of
the contract[,]”72 and a court will not overturn an arbitrator’s fact findings.73
A manifest disregard of the law, not merely an error in determination or
application of law, is required to vacate the arbitrator’s award.74
The Supreme Court has supported lower courts’ reluctance to second
guess arbitrators’ decisions on fact or law.75 As long an arbitrator is acting
within his or her authority, courts typically refuse to reverse an award even
if an arbitrator commits “serious error.”76 This deference to an arbitrator’s
award has included upholding an arbitrator’s opinion that a CBA requires
just cause for discharges, where the agreement does not explicitly restrict the
arbitrator’s authority to review discharges to determine whether the
employer had cause.77

69. PaineWebber, 49 F.3d at 352. But see Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Bishop, 596
F.3d 183, 195 n.16 (4th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing role of arbitration under agreements
providing expressly that employees are at will).
70. PaineWebber, 49 F.3d at 352.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
72. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
73. Entergy Operations, Inc. v. United Gov’t Sec. Officers, 856 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir.
2017) (citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987)).
74. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.
1967).
75. W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765 (1983).
76. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).
77. See, e.g., Kensington Cmty. Corp. for Individual Dignity v. Nat’l Union of Hosp. &
Health Care Emps., No. 15-2942, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85058 at *21 (E.D. Pa. June 28,
2016) (“As nothing in the agreement . . . explicitly restricts the arbitrator’s authority to review
whether there was cause for discharge . . . the Arbitrator’s reading is logical.”).
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Following this direction from the Supreme Court, a court will not
reverse a labor arbitration award so long as “the arbitrator’s award draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely [the
arbitrator’s] own brand of industrial justice . . . .”78 “An award draws its
essence from a collective bargaining agreement if its interpretation can in
any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.”79 This
deference allows an arbitrator to base a decision on “the industrial common
law — the practices of the industry and the shop.”80 For example, an
arbitrator’s interpretation of a CBA’s just cause provision drew its essence
from the agreement, even though the award required reinstatement of a
chronically absent employee, because the award was not “entirely
unsupported by the record” or in manifest disregard of the CBA.81 This
decision echoes that court’s earlier determination that because the term
“cause” in a CBA is ambiguous, “it is within the province of the arbitrator to
interpret the ambiguous phrase.”82 Even if a CBA allows management to
adopt policies or rules unilaterally, an arbitrator still retains the authority to
interpret any applicable just cause protection in the CBA.83
An award may be challenged if it conflicts with public policy, but only
based on a “well defined and dominant” public policy arising from “laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.”84 The Supreme Court rejected public-policy based challenges to
78. Id. at *8; see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Local 45C, Int’l Chem. Workers Union
Council, 587 F.3d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 2009) (mentioning that an arbitrator cannot “‘ignore the
plain language of the contract’ to impose his ‘own notions of industrial justice’”);
Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the court must overturn an arbitration award which “fails to draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator’s own notions of
right and wrong”).
79. Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d
Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
80. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
81. Dauphin Precision Tool v. United Steelworkers of Am., 338 Fed. App. 219, 223 (3d
Cir. 2009).
82. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman’s Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1295-96 (3d Cir.
1996); see also Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Sec., Police & Fire Prof’ls, No. 1:15-cv-01327JCC-IDD (E.D. Va. May 5, 2016) (finding employer’s policy supporting allegation of just
cause did not require discharge for grievant’s action, so arbitrator empowered to interpret
“just cause”); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Commonwealth Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters Local
502, 160 A.3d 928, 931-32 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (holding that the trial court erred to extent
that it held that arbitrator misinterpreted contract to require “just cause”).
83. Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Food & Commercial Workers, 739 F.3d
1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014); Breckenridge O’Fallon, Inc. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 682,
664 F.3d 1230, 1234, 1234 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012).
84. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
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arbitral awards reinstating a truck driver who tested positive for drugs,85 and
an operator of dangerous machinery found sitting alone in a car in the
company parking lot with a marijuana cigarette burning in the ashtray.86
The reluctance to reverse arbitration awards on public policy grounds
is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision that even well-founded civil
rights protections did not warrant the reversal of an arbitral award on public
policy grounds, even though the award enforced male employees’
contractual seniority over the equal-employment rights of female
employees.87 In making such a determination, a court must not “secondguess[] the arbitrator’s fact-finding,” especially where a reversal based on
public policy would require a court to draw factual inferences that were not
made by the arbitrator.88 Therefore, an award reversing a discharge decision
will only be overturned if a grievant’s reinstatement would violate a clear
public policy; conversely, an award in the employer’s favor will stand unless
the failure to reinstate would violate public policy.89
This limited judicial review of arbitration awards heightens the
importance of determining whether arbitrators’ interpretations of just cause
protections provide adequate protection for the interests of people with
disabilities. If the arbitrator addresses the ADA rights of the employee along
with a just cause determination, the employee may be left without any
judicial recourse beyond this limited review of the arbitration award, even
though she might otherwise have a claim under the ADA.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF JUST CAUSE IN RETAINING EMPLOYMENT FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Just cause provisions offer protection for employees with disabilities
who face discharge for a variety of reasons, including misconduct,
absenteeism, or an inability to otherwise perform their job duties. This
inability to perform, as well as some forms of misconduct or absenteeism,
often arise when the employer has not provided sufficient accommodation
for an employee’s disability. An employee with a disability may incorporate
a claim for accommodation in a just cause claim to get the issue before an
arbitrator who is otherwise reluctant to apply the ADA.90 Several aspects of
Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Local Union 204, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that “there is a well
defined and dominant national policy requiring strict adherence to nuclear safety rules”).
85. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62-67.
86. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 33, 42-45.
87. W.R. Grace and Co., 461 U.S. at 764-70.
88. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1988).
89. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62-63.
90. Daniel B. Moar, Arbitrating Hate: Why Binding Arbitration of Discrimination
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arbitration are important to understand to determine whether arbitration
provides a viable forum for people with disabilities to protect themselves
against unwarranted discharge. While these aspects do not always benefit
the employee with a disability, she is often treated more favorably under the
arbitrator’s analysis than she would be under judicial application of the
ADA.
First, placement of the burden of proof on the employer in arbitration
claims concerning just cause protection will benefit the employee with a
disability, who would carry the burden of proving discriminatory intent or
disparate impact in an ADA claim. Secondly, the application of just cause
principles can be beneficial for employees with disabilities for several
reasons, taking advantage of some of the basic principles requiring notice to
the employee of expected standards as well as consideration of the
employer’s past practice in enforcing such standards. In addition, employees
with disabilities can benefit from an arbitrator’s application of other
contractual rights as well as mitigating circumstances related to the basis for
the discharge, although an arbitrator may also consider the employer’s
interests in discharging the employee. Lastly, an arbitrator will determine
whether the employer had just cause to impose discharge, as opposed to
some lesser punishment, which can benefit an employee who might
otherwise fail to convince a court that an employer lacked a legitimate reason
for the discharge in an ADA claim if the employee engaged in some type of
bad behavior.
A. Burden of Proof
The discharge of an employee with a disability raises some interesting
issues of contract interpretation for an arbitrator. Placement of the burden of
proof on the employer can be particularly important in determining whether
the employee cannot perform essential job duties, because that employer
must then establish this negative fact. In addition, claims that turn on
medical evidence may be resolved in favor of the employee if the employer
cannot carry its burden of proving a critical medical fact regarding the
employee’s impairment as it relates to essential job duties.
In contrast to an ADA plaintiff’s burden of proof, the employer
typically carries the burden of proof in establishing that it had just cause to
discipline or discharge a grievant.91 At least some arbitrators take the
Claims is Appropriate for Union Members, 10 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 47, 62 (2008).
91. Laura J. Cooper, et al., How and Why Labor Arbitrators Decide Discipline and
Discharge Cases. An Empirical Examination, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 60TH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 420, 451-52 (2007); Arnold M. Zack, How
Arbitrators Decide Cases: An Arbitrator’s View, in HOW ADR WORKS 515, 522 (Norman
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position that the burden of proof remains with the employer even if a grievant
raises statutory protections which would otherwise place the burden of proof
on the plaintiff-employee.92 Claims by employees with disabilities often turn
on what duties are essential and whether the employee can perform those
duties.93 The resolution of these factual questions often turns on the
arbitrator’s application of the burden of proof, when presented as a question
of just cause. In situations where the grievant also invokes contractual rights,
such as a right to take leave or transfer to another position as an alternative
to discharge, the burden would be on the union or the employee to establish
a violation of that contractual right.94
If a grievant has invoked just cause protection, the applicable standard
of proof in discharge cases usually requires that the employer prove both that
the employee committed the offense for which she was discharged and that
the offense warranted the degree of discipline imposed.95 Typically the
employer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that its
action was justified.96 Some arbitrators adhere to the proposition that “the
more serious the charge against an employee the higher the level of proof is
required to make the case.”97 In one study of 2,055 awards, it was determined
that over 88% of the arbitrators applied the preponderance standard.98
Another study of 1,432 awards concerning discharges found that 9.9%
articulated the burden of proof at preponderance of the evidence and 12.2%
required proof of just cause by clear and convincing evidence (making proof
of just cause significantly more difficult), whereas 76% of the awards did not
identify an applicable quantum standard.99
Under the burden to produce a preponderance of evidence to support
Brand, ed., BNA: Washington, D.C. 2002); see, e.g., Waste Corp. of Mo., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1654, 1655 (2013) (Fizsimmons, Arb.) (holding that in discharge cases, the arbitrator
must determine whether the employer had just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment);
Atl. Se. Airlines, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 515, 521 (1993) (Nolan, Arb.) (“By long and
well-recognized custom in labor arbitration, employers bear the burden of proof in
disciplinary cases.”).
92. Zack, supra note 92, at 522.
93. See discussion infra at notes 105-120 and accompanying text.
94. Zack, supra note 92, at 519-20.
95. See, e.g., Farmland Foods, Inc., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 745, 748 (2012) (Bonney,
Arb.) (“In order to shoulder its burden, the employer must prove both that the employee
committed the offense for which she was discharged and that the offense warranted the degree
of discipline imposed.”).
96. Cooper, supra note 92, at 452. See, e.g., Meridian Med. Techs., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1564, 1567 (2001) (King, Arb.) (“Generally, the employer meets this burden if it
shows, by a preponderance of evidence, that its action was justified.”).
97. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 723 (2015) (Imundo,
Arb.).
98. Cooper, supra note 92, at 453.
99. Bognanno, supra note 40, at 174-77.
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the employer’s action, circumstantial evidence can be used to establish the
elements of a particular action, but the evidence must “do more than give
rise to mere suspicion,”100 and should be “based on a reasonable probability
and not on mere speculation.”101 Such words of caution are particularly
appropriate for decisions involving the discharge of employees with
disabilities because the employer assumes that they cannot perform the
duties of the position, pose a direct threat, or will not be available to return
to work in a reasonable amount of time. Thus, placing the burden of proof
on the employer may by itself provide protection for employees with
disabilities that they would not enjoy under the ADA alone.
1. Proof of What Duties are Essential
Arbitration can play several roles with respect to the ability to perform
the essential duties of the position, including making factual determinations
regarding the grievant’s abilities or the essential nature of the job duties
which she cannot perform. An employee with a disability often faces
discharge based on an employer’s belief that she can no longer perform the
job duties. This employee will benefit from just cause protection if the
employer cannot establish by a preponderance of the evidence that her
disability prevents her from performing an essential job duty.102 For
example, an employer could not establish that the grievant was discharged
for a “job-related reason” based on his inability to lift over fifty pounds,
where the employee continued to work successfully for several months under
these restrictions before his discharge.103
Arbitrators often give considerable deference to an employer’s

100. Mich. Milk Producers Ass’n, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024, 1029 (2000)
(McDonald, Arb.).
101. Dietrich Indus., Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 287, 289 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.).
102. See, e.g., Noranda Aluminum, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 217, 221 (2003) (Gordon,
Arb.) (“In sum, Grievant’s discharge lacked just cause because it was based on medical
evaluation that, under the circumstances, should have been more extensive.”).
103. Coreslab Structures, 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 329, 332 (2011) (Pratte, Arb.); see
also Bowater, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 129, 137 (2004) (Harris, Arb.) (finding sufficient
medical evidence to establish grievant’s ability to perform job duties); Super Value, 119 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1377, 1382-83 (2004) (Daly, Arb.) (finding no just cause to discharge a
maintenance mechanic with glaucoma who could still “drive slow-moving man-lift vehicles
in the . . . warehouse”); Beef Prods., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1308, 1311-12 (2002) (Allen,
Arb.) (ruling that an employer violated CBA by discharging grievant who was not totally
disabled according to medical evidence); Davis Wire Corp., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1345,
1350 (2000) (Olson, Arb.) (overturning refusal to return grievant to work based on physician’s
general recommendation); Eastwood Printing Co., 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 957, 963 (1992)
(Winwood, Arb.) (finding no just cause because employer failed to investigate employee’s
ability to use arm to perform duties).
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definition of which duties are essential, as they do in ADA decisions.104
Despite this deference, placement of the burden of proof on the employer
may make such deference less automatic. One arbitrator explained that an
employer can establish just cause related to an inability to perform one’s job
duties based on its “objective evaluation of medical evidence, a fair
evaluation of the physical requirements of the essential functions to be
performed and the ability to provide work within the employee’s
restrictions.”105 In contrast to arbitrators’ typical deference to past practice
to interpret ambiguous contractual obligations, duties may still be deemed
essential even if the employer’s past practice has not included assignment of
the duties in question over a long period of time.106
Under the ADA, the duty to accommodate turns on whether the
proposed accommodation would enable the employee with a disability to
perform the duties of the position.107 Arbitrators follow this same line of
logic. If an employee cannot perform any work available with the employer,
then the employer has just cause to discharge her.108 For example, an
employer had just cause to discharge a material handler who could not stand,
kneel and climb as required of his position.109 The duties could not be
performed even if he was allowed to take the number of breaks
recommended by his doctor, notably more than allowed for other
employees.110
In contrast, an employer may lack just cause despite an employee’s
inability to perform the duties of a position, if accommodation would have
enabled her to do so. For example, GTE lacked just cause to discharge a
technician who could perform his work even though he could not climb
ladders, where technicians typically chose their specific jobs and he could
choose jobs which did not require ladder work.111 Thus, without specifically
invoking the ADA’s protections, this grievant was reinstated because the
employer failed to prove that the duties he could not perform were not
essential to his position.
104. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8); see, e.g., Gardenhire v. Manville, No. 15-cv-4914-DDC-KGS,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15348 at *15-16 (Feb. 2, 2017) (referring to job description as
evidence of essential functions).
105. Premier Mfg. Support Svcs., 2005 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 111197 (2005)
(Hetrick, Arb.).
106. 148147-AAA, 2013 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148147 (2013) (Daly, Arb.)
(noting that fire suppression duties were essential for the firefighter dispatch job, even though
the duty was not assigned to dispatchers over 36 years).
107. Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001); LaChance v.
Duffer’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998).
108. CH2M-WG Idaho, 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 876, 885-86 (2014) (DiFalco, Arb.).
109. Case Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 3-4 (1999) (Thornell, Arb.).
110. Id.
111. GTE North, 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1047, 1049-50, 1052 (1999) (Daniel, Arb.).
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In a more complex example, an employer demonstrated just cause to
discharge a driver with a mental illness, without accommodating him, where
the arbitrator concluded that the chances for rehabilitation were “remote” so
as to enable the employee to perform the job duties.112 Under a clear and
convincing evidence standard, this arbitrator concluded that the employer
established just cause to discharge an employee with “psychiatric problems”
based on “poor job performance and extraordinary actions” which included
wearing a Halloween costume to work.113 Even though the CBA
incorporated the duty to accommodate under the ADA, the arbitrator
emphasized that the “primary controlling factor in this arbitration case is the
[a]greement between the parties, specifically the just cause requirement for
discharge.”114 The arbitrator concluded that the employer had just cause to
discharge the driver based in large part on his doctor’s statement that he
lacked control over his aggression and hostility and the driver’s failure to
take his prescribed medication.115
These arbitration awards illustrate how an employee with a disability
can benefit from the placement of the burden of proof on the employer to
establish her inability to perform the essential duties of the position. In
contrast, under the ADA, the employee carries the burden of proof to
establish discrimination, which includes not only the existence of their
disability, but also the fact that she is otherwise qualified to perform the
duties of the position.116 In situations where the employer controls the
information regarding the nature of the plaintiff’s work as well as the duties
of other employees, this burden can be a difficult one to meet.117
2. Medical Evidence
Like their judicial counterparts, arbitrators will consistently find just
cause for the discharge of an employee based on factual determinations that
the grievant’s impairment prevents their performance of the duties or
required work hours of the position.118 Generally, employers are entitled to
112. Interstate Brands Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 168-69 (1999) (Howell,
Arb.).
113. Id. at 166, 168-69.
114. Id. at 168.
115. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806
(1999).
117. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877, 890-91 (10th Cir.
2015) (requiring the plaintiff to prove ability to perform essential duties of the position).
118. Dairy Fresh of Ala., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 137 (2011) (Moreland, Arb.)
(holding that the employer had just cause to discharge employee with manic depression unable
to perform duties per independent medical examiner); Union Tank Car Co., 130 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 62, 66-67 (2011) (Fullmer, Arb.) (finding that one of four doctor’s reports
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rely on their medical advisors “where there is no reason to doubt their
accuracy or good faith . . . .”119 However, that evidence must be reliable
enough to support a finding of just cause.120 For example, after finding that
the grievant was not a person with a disability under the ADA, one award
held that the employer had just cause to discharge an employee with a lifting
restriction which prevented him from performing common duties of his
position without any accommodation.121
The just cause standard has been relied upon to deny grievances of
employees with disabilities based on medical evidence related to the
grievants’ ability to perform the duties of their positions.122 For example, an
employer showed just cause to discharge a janitor based on the employer’s
conclusion that the grievant’s medical restrictions did not justify his refusal
to perform his job duties.123 At the same time, an arbitrator may require that
an employer engage in the interactive process, as contemplated by the
ADA,124 to determine whether the grievant is able to perform the duties of
her position.125
As with the question of which duties are essential, placement of the
burden of proof on the employer requires the production of reliable medical
justified employer’s refusal to allow grievant to return to work under burden on grievant to
show lack of just cause); Techneglass Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 722, 726-27 (2004)
(Dean, Arb.) (ruling that just cause was shown by grievant’s inability to perform duties);
United Refining Co., 2003 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 110488 (2003) (Miller, Arb.) (ruling
that just cause was shown where grievant was unable to work eight hour day indefinitely and
no part-time jobs were available); Empire Coke Co., 2001 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp.
109273 (2001) (Giblin, Arb.) (finding proper cause for discharge where impairment from on
the job injury prevented performance of duties); City of St. Paul, 1996 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
Supp. 117294 (1996) (Berquist, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge employee who could
not perform duties in timely manner); Meier Metal Servicenters, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
816, 819 (1993) (Morgan, Arb.).
119. DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
A NUTSHELL 259 (3d ed. 2017).
120. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 425.
121. City of Minneapolis, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 558, 562 (2008) (Chernos, Arb.).
122. See, e.g., Rock-Tenn Servs., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1468, 1487-88 (2013)
(Kossoff, Arb.); Rochdale Vill., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 196, 198-99 (2008) (Gregory,
Arb.); Bradford White Corp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 114, 117-18 (1999) (Allen, Arb.)
(ruling that employer could rely on doctor’s statement that grievant could return to work); see
also Westinghouse Hanford Co., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 46, 51-52 (1993) (Nelson, Arb.)
(ruling that employer could rely on medical evaluation showing inability to work).
123. U.S. Steel Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005) (Peterson, Arb.).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2017); Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir.
2001); see also Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284-86 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that an employer cannot assume inability to perform without engaging in the
interactive process).
125. Milwaukee Transp. Servs., 2009 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 119548 (2009)
(Vernon, Arb.); Minn. Mining & Mfg., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1055, 1059-60 (1999)
(Bankston, Arb.).
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evidence that the employee cannot perform the essential job duties of the
position, or that the employee poses a direct threat even with
accommodation.126 For example, an arbitrator reinstated an employee whose
doctors stated that he could safely return to work because his manic
depression was in remission, despite his employer’s desire for a guarantee
that the employee would not suffer another attack.127 In contrast, under the
ADA the employee would carry the burden of producing medical evidence
establishing her ability to perform the duties of the position, either with or
without reasonable accommodation.128 Given the potential uncertainty
surrounding medical diagnoses as well as ambiguity regarding job duties,
this burden often proves to be too difficult for an ADA plaintiff to meet.129
Thus, any ambiguity works in favor of a grievant with a disability where the
employer carries the burden of establishing just cause.
B. Application of Just Cause Principles in Arbitration
Employees with disabilities may benefit from an arbitrator’s
incorporation of a duty to accommodate into interpretations of just cause
protection in CBA’s.
One arbitrator explained that reasonable
accommodation “has long been recognized as an element of just cause by
arbitrators[,]” in part based on the broader societal value of the right of
persons with disabilities to “hold jobs they can perform . . . .”130 To fulfill
that value, the arbitrator stated that while he could not determine whether the
employer violated the ADA, he could look to the ADA for guidance as to
whether the employer’s decision to discharge the grievant based on absences
126. Hatter v. WMATA, 244 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136-37 (D.D.C. 2017) (employer failed to
present evidence of inability to perform essential functions of job); Osborne v. Baxter
Haealthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2015) (burden on employer to establish
direct threat with reasonable accommodation).
127. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1199, 1202 (1992) (Nolan, Arb.).
128. See, e.g., Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1999)
(finding that employee with multiple sclerosis and depression failed to prove ability to
perform duties).
129. See, e.g., Bratten v. SSI Servs., 185 F.3d 625, 635 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding
physician’s testimony insufficient to establish that employee was otherwise qualified).
130. Thermo King, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 612, 615 (1993) (Dworkin, Arb.); see also
GTE N. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665, 672 (1999) (Brodsky, Arb.) (concluding that
incorporation of reasonable accommodation into just cause determination was appropriate
based on CBA’s inclusion of both general nondiscrimination clause and conflict with law
provision); Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 4, 8 (1996) (Ross, Arb.); Beckett
Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1135, 1139 (1996) (Goggin, Arb.) (holding that just
cause requirement requires reasonable accommodation as alternative to discharge from
position that employee cannot otherwise perform); Meijer Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
834, 840 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.) (noting that rights established by law must be taken into
consideration in determining whether just cause exists).
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and tardiness related to his disability and “beyond his control” was “just and
fair.”131
Under this approach, an arbitrator should consider an employer’s duty
to accommodate when determining whether the employer had just cause to
discharge an employee who was not accommodated.132 Incorporation of
reasonable accommodation into a just cause determination can be
appropriate based on the CBA’s inclusion of both a general
nondiscrimination clause and a conflict with law provision.133 Even a nondiscrimination provision alone has been interpreted as sufficient to consider
the ADA’s requirements.134
In 1966, Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty set forth seven tests for
determining just cause; a “no” response to any of these questions would
result in a finding of a lack of just cause:135
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or
foreknowledge of the possible or probably [sic] disciplinary
consequences of the employee’s conduct?
2. Was the company’s rule or managerial order reasonably
related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the
company’s business and (b) the performance that the company
might properly expect of the employee?
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an
employee, make an effort to discover whether the employee
did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of management?
4. Was the company’s investigation conducted fairly and
objectively?
5. At the investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial
evidence or proof that the employee was guilty as charged?
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties
evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in
a particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of
the employee’s proven offense and (b) the record of the
employee in his service with the company?
These seven tests have been characterized as “the most specifically
articulated analysis of the just cause standard as well as an extremely
131. 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 615.
132. Ariana R. Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of
Employment-Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789 (2013).
133. GTE N. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 665.
134. Perfection Bakeries, Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043 (1997) (Stallworth, Arb.);
Champion Int’l Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024 (1996) (Howell, Arb.); see also
Fairweather’s PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 578 (Ray J. Schoonhoven
ed., 4th ed. 1999).
135. Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359, 363-64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.)
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practical approach”136 and, perhaps for this reason, have been used routinely
for over fifty years.137 This test has been described as “the single most
definitive statement of just cause”138 and “undeniably influential.”139 Others
have described this test as enjoying “‘widespread acceptance.’”140 Some
have said that these tests have “helped to improve the fairness of disciplinary
processes . . . .”141 One court characterized the test as providing a “helpful
and familiar rubric by which an arbitrator can assess whether good cause for
discipline exists in a particular circumstance.”142 Despite its apparent
widespread acceptance, one study found that only 9.4% of 1,432 arbitration
awards concerning employee discharges explicitly utilized the just cause
rubric,143 but this study may not have captured the unstated influence of the
rule.
These principles for applying a just cause clause to a particular
employee’s discharge benefit employees with disabilities for several reasons,
including the employer’s general obligation to provide notice of any policies
for which the employee might be disciplined and to treat similarly situated
employees comparably. In addition, an employee with a disability will at
least sometimes benefit from other contractual protections that may be
interpreted jointly with a just cause provision or separately to the employee’s
benefit. Employees with disabilities will also often benefit from an
arbitrator’s consideration of mitigating circumstances in determining
whether the employer had just cause to discharge them, including the role of
the person’s impairment in the discharge decision as well as the
appropriateness of discharge as the level of discipline.
1. Notice & Past Practice
The principles of just cause suggest that an employee must be aware of
the rule or other criteria relied upon by the employer in making the decision
136. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 27.
137. See Summit Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., Local 4546, 865
N.E.2d 31, 31-36 (Ohio 2007); see e.g., KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 2 and n.1, 24-25,
and n.59 and 60.
138. CHRISTINE D. VER PLOEG, Investigatory Due Process and Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY SKILLS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 220, 223–24 (Gruenberg ed.,
1993).
139. JAMES OLDHAM, Due Process in Discipline and Discharge: §6.12 Due Process in
General, THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS 201, 202
cmt.(a)(3) (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
140. Bognanno, supra note 40, at 158.
141. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 32, at 29.
142. Summit Cty., 865 N.E.2d at 36.
143. Bognanno, supra note 40, at 174.
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to discharge her.144 Progressive discipline, at least for certain offenses, may
also be implied as part of just cause.145 Despite this notice requirement, some
actions may be so commonly acknowledged as wrong by society, such as
theft, or in the workplace, such as falling asleep on the job, as to obviate the
need for prior notice.146
Notice to employees that discharge can result as a penalty for certain
behavior may also be required.147 The just cause principle of providing a
warning may benefit a grievant who allegedly has engaged in misconduct,
as in the employee who was not warned that he could be discharged if he did
not take his medication for depression and the employee who was not warned
against sleeping during a break.148
Arbitration decisions have long recognized the right of a company to
impose a non-disciplinary discharge, including discharge based on the
employee’s inability to perform the work.149 This right is not absolute,
however, as the employer may have an obligation to warn and work with the
employee150 and provide adequate training,151 in a way that is “calculated to
address the particular employee . . . .”152 For example, a power company
lacked just cause to discharge an employee with a learning disability, despite
his failing a mandatory hazardous materials handling course, based on its
failure to tailor its instruction to his disability.153
Like the notice requirement, consideration of an employer’s past
practice can be beneficial for an employee asserting a lack of just cause. If
a contract term is vague or ambiguous, the arbitrator will turn to past practice
to help interpret that right.154 Past practice can be used to supplement the
actual contractual language that applies, but only if such a practice is
established by mutual acceptance by the parties of a clear and consistent
practice over a significant period of time.155 Past practice can be particularly

144. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 35-39.
145. Id. at 70-75.
146. Id. at 39-46.
147. Id. at 47-50.
148. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 302, 306 (1995) (Concepcion,
Arb.); EG & G Mound Applied Techs., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60, 63-64 (1993) (Heekin,
Arb.) (“[B]efore disciplinary action can be taken, the subject employee must previously have
been aware, or should have been aware, of the conduct expected.”).
149. Florsheim Shoe Co., 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 708-09 (1980) (Roberts, Arb.).
150. Id. at 709.
151. Bell Helicopter Textron, 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1139, 1141 (1980) (Shearer,
Arb.).
152. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 393, 399 (1993)
(Pelofsky, Arb.).
153. Id.
154. Zack, supra note 93, at 520.
155. NOLAN & BALES, supra note 120, at 248-49.
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helpful to guard against the influence of implicit biases against employees
with disabilities, since an employer is expected to apply standards
consistently across all similarly situated employees.
Past practice involves the comparison of the treatment of the grievant
to how the employer has dealt with other employees in the past.156 Of course
the grievant must establish that her conduct is similar enough to the conduct
of another employee to benefit from the employer’s past practice of excusing
that behavior.157
If a grievant with a disability has been treated more harshly than other
employees, consideration of past practice can support an arbitrator’s finding
of a lack of just cause in favor of an employee with a disability. For example,
an arbitrator relied on the just cause provision of a CBA to sustain the
grievance of an employee with a disability who was discharged after being
absent for more than six months after being injured on job.158 The arbitrator
engaged in typical just cause analysis, finding that the employer’s policy of
discharging all employees who are absent for over six months had not been
applied consistently, and that the CBA allowed for a leave of absence “for
good cause,” defined to include accidental injury.159
Similarly, a driver’s grievance was sustained under the CBA’s just
cause standard where the employer failed to warn him that he would be
discharged if he did not take his medication, and the employer had tolerated
his condition for a long time.160 This award relied on basic principles of just
cause – the failure to warn employees and employer’s past acceptance of
behavior as minimizing factors.161 Neither of these employees would have
been guaranteed success in an ADA claim, because both absenteeism and
insubordination can constitute legitimate business reasons for discharge.
These awards illustrate the benefit of a CBA’s just cause provision to push
an employer to provide accommodations, regardless of whether the employer
had a duty to accommodate under the ADA.
Grievants with disabilities may fail in challenging a discharge where
other employees with similar characteristics have been treated similarly.162
Under just cause analysis, arbitrators similarly consider the nature of the
156. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 20.
157. Id. at 375.
158. Magnolia Mktg. Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 102, 109 (1996) (Chumley, Arb.).
159. Id.
160. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 305-06.
161. Id. at 306.
162. See, e.g., Safeway Corp., 2008 Lab. Arb. Supp. 119039 (Wages, Arb. 2008) (holding
that the grievant was treated consistently with past practice of assigning injured employees to
different work). But see Dept. of Commerce, 1999 Lab. Arb. Supp. (BNA) 107763 (finding
that an employer is obligated to accommodate employee where similar employees had been
accommodated in the past).
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threat posed by the employee who has been discharged.163 An employer had
just cause to discharge an employee with schizophrenia, for example, where
coworkers felt threatened by the employee’s comment, “‘[n]o wonder people
bring guns to work[,]’” made in response to harassment by coworkers.164
Analogizing to the dismissal of an ADA claim by an employee who
threatened to kill a coworker,165 the arbitrator found that the employer had
discharged other employees whose actions were “provocative, hostile,
threatening and could easily rise to a level of violence.”166
Under just cause analysis, employees who allegedly pose a direct threat
may benefit from the principle of considering how other similarly situated
employees have been treated. In upholding the grievance against Walt
Disney, for example, the arbitrator noted that just cause protection applies
regardless of the employee’s seniority, where an employee with more
seniority had not been discharged for engaging in assaultive behavior.167
Past practice analysis can also benefit a grievant who has been
discharged for his absenteeism if the employer has not discharged similarly
situated employees in the past, so as to put him on notice that he could be
discharged based on his absenteeism.168 Conversely, an employer’s
consistent enforcement of an absenteeism policy will help establish just
cause to discharge a grievant with a similar record.169
Following this line of logic, an employer’s past practice of providing a
transfer to another position, including light duty, can help sustain the
grievance of a similarly situated employee with a disability who seeks a
similar transfer.170 In contrast, other arbitrators have found that an employer
need not create a light duty position for a grievant.171 These seemingly
inconsistent awards are consistent with court analysis under the ADA, which
163. See, e.g., CH2M-WG Idaho, 134 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA) 876, 883-84 (Difalco, Arb.
2014) (finding plaintiff’s exposure at work posed a direct threat to her health).
164. Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 312, 318-20 (2008) (Cohen, Arb.).
165. Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997).
166. Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 319.
167. Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 353, 356-57 (2010) (Abrams, Arb.).
168. Phx. Newspapers Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 771, 774-75 (2004) (Rothstein,
Arb.).
169. Allied Healthcare Prods., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 890, 894 (2004) (Fitzsimmons,
Arb.).
170. Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1191 (2000) (Statham,
Arb.); see also Exxon Co., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 534, 539-40 (1998) (Allen, Arb.)
(explaining how transferring away stress-causing coworkers is warranted where similarlysituated others had been transferred).
171. Ga. Pac., Lab. Arb. Rep. Supp. (BNA) 104307, at 13 (1999) (Duda, Arb.); see also
Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 650, 652 (1993) (Jones, Arb.) (finding no
requirement in CBA to create light duty position, without mention of ADA); Ogden Maint.
Co., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 467, 470 (1993) (Harr, Arb.) (noting the lack of contractual
obligation to create light duty job).
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typically does not require the creation of a position, but may require
placement of an employee with a disability in an available light duty
position.172
These arbitration awards demonstrate that an employee with a disability
may benefit from an employer’s more lenient or favorable treatment of other
employees who are not disabled, engaged in similar conduct, but did not
suffer the same consequences. In contrast, under the ADA, an employer’s
past provision of an accommodation does not necessarily establish that the
accommodation requested by an employee with a disability is reasonable or
does not impose an undue hardship.173
2. Supplemental Contractual Rights
Employees’ just cause protections may be supplemented or supplanted
by other contractual rights. Contractual provisions, or the lack thereof, can
be significant in determining whether the employer had just cause to
discharge an employee with a disability based on their inability to perform
the job duties, their unavailability for work, or misconduct. In addition, just
cause analysis can be affected significantly by the omission of an obligation
to follow the ADA in a CBA. One award, for example, held that the
employer had just cause to discharge an employee whose impairment
prevented performance of his job duties, without offering any
accommodation, because the CBA did not specifically incorporate the
ADA.174
In line with this reasoning, some arbitrators have refused to look beyond
the language of the applicable CBA in resolving grievances, even if filed by
a person with a disability as defined by the ADA, who might benefit from
the application of the ADA.175 This can result in a finding of just cause to
discharge an employee with a disability without reaching the question of
reasonable accommodation. For example, one arbitrator found just cause to
discharge an employee who became involved in altercations with co-workers
without considering the possible need for accommodations which would
172. Stacy A. Hickox, Transfer as an Accommodation: Standards from Discrimination
Cases and Theory, 62 ARK. L. REV. 195, 206-14 (2009).
173. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n, 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding
that plaintiff’s employer was not required to allow continued leave to plaintiff even though
the employer had granted it before because continued leave would have created an undue
burden on the employer).
174. Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1041, 1048 (1994)
(Canestraight, Arb).
175. See id. (finding no contractual duty to transfer employee with disability); see also
Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 652 (explaining that an arbitrator was not
empowered to interpret the ADA).
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have addressed the perceived harassment the grievant experienced which led
to the altercations.176 In contrast, some arbitrators look to the ADA to help
define a contractual obligation to provide accommodations to employees
with disabilities.177
Some arbitrators may not apply a just cause analysis, but still
consistently find that the employer was empowered to discharge an
employee who could no longer perform her job duties.178 In contrast to CBAs
which are silent on an employer’s obligations to reassign duties or the
employee who cannot perform, contractual requirements may create such an
obligation. Under a just cause provision, for example, an employer lacked
just cause to discharge a grievant who could not perform all of the expected
duties of her chicken processing plant position because of her work-related
impairment which was known to the employer.179
Despite its benefits, just cause may not provide protection for an
employee who engages in clear misconduct, particularly when prohibited by
specific language in a CBA or employer policy. For example, two different
employers had just cause to discharge employees who left their workplaces
without permission, despite claims that the grievants needed to leave to seek
medical treatment and could not perform the assigned duties, respectively.180
One of these awards was based on clear language in the CBA that leaving
176. Beckett Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1138-39.
177. See, e.g., Multi-Clean, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 463, 467 (1993) (Miller,
Arb.).
178. Rock Tenn Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1191-92 (2014) (Miles, Arb.)
(denying grievance because no job was available consistent with restrictions); Nashville
Symphony Ass’n, 132 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 174, 189-90 (2013) (Ruben, Arb.) (relying on
employer’s opinion that employee with disability had not recovered musical skills,
distinguished from artistic incompetence or misbehavior); Anchor Hocking, 129 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1619, 1623 (2011) (Murphy, Arb.) (accepting employer’s argument that
legitimate business interests prevented allowing grievant to work four-hour day); Bobcat Co.,
121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 535, 538 (2005) (Jacobowski, Arb.) (finding no contractual right
to return to work when no part time positions available) City of Roswell, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1153, 1159 (1998) (Wyman, Arb.) (denying grievance as grievant continued to be
medically incapable of performing driver duties); City of Tampa, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
65, 72-76 (1998) (Hoffman, Arb.) (examining lifting and movement restrictions that
prevented performance of job duties); Perfection Bakeries, 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043,
1159 (1997) (Stallworth, Arb.) (allowing non-disciplinary discharge based on grievant’s
inability to perform job due to injury); Frito-Lay, 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 993, 995 (1994)
(Bittel, Arb.) (agreeing that progressive discipline followed in addressing sales deficiencies
fulfilled obligation to reasonably accommodate grievant); Ogden Maint. Co., 101 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) at 470 (finding that employer had implied authority to discharge employee who
cannot perform duties).
179. ConAgra Poultry Co., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1029, 1034 (2001) (Eisenmenger,
Arb.).
180. Monongalia Cty. Coal Co., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 131, 134-35 (2015) (Nicholas,
Arb.); NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1702, 1707-09 (2015) (Riker, Arb.).
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work without permission warranted discharge, and the potential harm his
actions could have caused the employer and its customers.181 Similarly, two
different employers had just cause to discharge grievants who refused to
abide by mandatory referrals to employee assistance programs.182
Arbitrators’ review of claims by employees in need of leave can
produce very different results than would occur under the ADA, depending
on which contractual provisions apply. Under the ADA, leave can be
considered a reasonable accommodation, but at the same time, courts have
consistently held that an employee who engages in erratic attendance or does
not properly inform her employer about impending absences is not otherwise
qualified for employment.183 Likewise, under the ADA, employers typically
need not accommodate employees who cannot predict when they will be able
to return to work or whose leave has exceeded the amount of leave provided
by a CBA or an employer’s policy, without considering whether than policy
provides adequate accommodation.184
Like these courts, arbitrators considering questions of leave usage and
absenteeism look to contractual provisions as well as sometimes considering
the duty to accommodate under the ADA. Generally, “[t]he right to
terminate employees for excessive absences, even where they are caused by
illness, is generally recognized by arbitrators.”185 Questions of attendance
may or may not be addressed by a just cause provision of a CBA or an
employee handbook. If the just cause provision applies to any discharge, or
at least discharges which are not voluntary or layoffs, then the employee will
be protected by that provision.186 For example, two different employers
lacked just cause to discipline grievants whose absences were allegedly
unsupported by medical documentation, where the grievants followed the
procedures required by the parties’ CBA and the employer’s absenteeism
policy.187
Even with just cause protection, however, excessive absences188 or the
181. NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1707-08.
182. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1081, 1083 (1996) (Thornell,
Arb.); Boise Cascade Corp., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 293-94 (1994) (Lundberg, Arb.).
183. See, e.g., Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 F.3d 917, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1999).
184. Stacy Hickox & Joseph Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: When is Enough,
Enough?, 62 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 437, 457-71 (2014).
185. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 42, at 796.
186. S. Peninsula Hosp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 676, 678 (2004) (Landau, Arb.).
187. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 369, 371 (1996) (Flaten, Arb.);
Rollyson Aluminum Prods. Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 588, 590-91 (1994) (Heekin,
Arb.) (finding that the employer failed to establish that grievant’s absences were not medically
excused, but denying back pay based on grievant’s attitude).
188. Medco Health Sols., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1739-40 (finding just cause where
grievant was so unreliable as to be of “no value”); Armstrong World Indus., 114 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 540, 547 (2000) (Chumley, Arb.) (finding just cause based on 57% attendance

HICKOX_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

372

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/10/2018 3:15 PM

[Vol. 20.2

length of the leave alone189 have been sufficient to provide employers with
justification for discharge, often without any consideration of the ADA’s
specific parameters for an alternative schedule or leave as an
accommodation. Even if the absenteeism is related to an impairment, where
the threshold of “excessive” is reached, non-disciplinary termination is
proper.190 When employees on leave are unlikely to ever be able to return to
work191 or show an improvement in attendance,192 arbitrators have found that
the employers had just cause to discharge them. Just cause may also be based
on the grievant’s failure to follow the employer’s procedures associated with
taking time off.193 Regardless of just cause protection, a grievant may fail to
successfully challenge his discharge if his leave exceeded the amount
provided by the CBA.194
In contrast to these awards, an employee may benefit from specific
violations, previous issues, presumed failure to take medication, attitude, and problems for
co-workers); Cont’l Cement Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 829, 836 (1996) (Hilgert, Arb.)
(explaining just cause under absenteeism policy).
189. 148147-AAA, 2013 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148147 (2013) (Daly, Arb.); see
also Titan Tire Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 235, 237, 254-55 (2015) (Szuter, Arb.)
(finding that the CBA stated that employee loses rights after 24 months of leave); CooperStandard Auto. Grp., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1700, 1704 (2011) (Dilts, Arb.) (noting that
the CBA provides for loss of seniority after two years on leave); Delta Nat’l Kraft, 123 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 858, 861 (2007) (Finston, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge an employee
whose leave exceeded the one year provided under CBA); AT&T Corp., 2005 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) Supp. 115056 (2005) (Goldstein, Arb.) (finding just cause to discharge employee who
had been accommodated but still with significant absences over a two year period); Case
Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 449, 451 (2004) (Neigh, Arb.) (finding no violation based
on discharge after thirty months of leave provided in CBA); CenterPoint Energy, 119 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 102 (2003) (Bognanno, Arb.) (holding employer did not violate CBA by
discharging grievant after two years of long term disability); Sys. Sensor, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1186, 1191 (1999) (Cohen, Arb.) (finding that a 50% absence rate justified discharge);
Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 121 (1998) (Heekin, Arb.) (enforcing
one year leave provision in CBA based on consistent past enforcement); Cty. of Sacramento,
109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 440, 445 (1997) (Gentile, Arb.) (finding that absences totaling
60% of work time over past year justified discharge); Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) at 652 (finding that CBA required return to work after 12 months of leave).
190. Medco Health Sols., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1739 (2010) (Watkins, Arb.);
Husky Oil Co., 65 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 47, 50 (1975) (Richardson, Arb.) (basing conclusion
on review of 50 awards).
191. See, e.g., Meier Metal Servicenters, Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 819
(explaining physical condition making employee unable to work can constitute just cause);
Papercraft Corp., 85 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 962 (1985) (Hales, Arb.) (holding that employer
was allowed to discharge where nature of employee’s illness rendered him, perhaps forever,
unable to perform work duties for which he was hired).
192. Thermo King, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 616-17 (explaining that the ADA does
not require allowing an employee to be late or miss work whenever impairment “makes it
uncomfortable for him to meet his schedule”).
193. H. S. Auto., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 172, 174-75 (1993) (Heekin, Arb.).
194. ATC/Vancom of Cal., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 615, 618 (2004) (McKay, Arb.).
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contractual provisions providing for some period of leave or a specific
absenteeism policy. A discharge violated a CBA, for example, where an
employee on long-term disability was discharged under a CBA that failed to
provide that seniority is lost to employees on long-term disability, and no
employees on long-term disability had been discharged in the past.195
Similarly, reinstatement was required by a CBA which provided for personal
leave of absence of an unlimited duration for “good and sufficient cause.”196
This arbitrator explained that “good and sufficient cause” should be based
on “any absence that precedes the request, the duration of the employee’s
expected absence, the likelihood that he will be able to resume his duties on
his return, and the business needs of the Employer.”197 Without any mention
of the ADA, this analysis parallels an undue hardship analysis under that
statute.198
Like claims involving a leave of absence, a grievant may benefit from
a specific contractual provision regarding absenteeism. For example, an
employer violated a CBA with a specific absenteeism policy when it
attempted to unilaterally change how that policy was applied.199 Similarly,
a CBA which includes a specific absenteeism policy could not be unilaterally
changed by an employer to the detriment of an employee who failed to follow
the revised policy.200
Likewise, just cause analysis has benefitted grievants who failed to
follow required processes connected with their use of leave. For example,
an arbitrator relied on just cause analysis to reinstate an employee who
notified human resources but not the employer’s FMLA administrator that
he needed to miss work due to his disability.201 The arbitrator considered the
grievant’s years of service and the symptoms of his disability that interfered
with his ability to report his need for time off. It should be noted, however,
that the arbitrator did impose a ninety-day suspension for which the grievant
would not receive back pay.202
Similarly, other grievants have benefitted from just cause analysis
applied to their alleged failure to provide their employers with sufficient

195. Dynergy Midwest Generation, 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1529, 1534-35 (2013)
(Dichter, Arb.).
196. Mills Co., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1723, 1726-28 (2005) (Franckiewicz, Arb.).
197. Id. at 1728.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2017). See, e.g., Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s
Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the burden is on the employer
to show undue hardship).
199. Avery Dennison Corp., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1170, 1182-84 (2004) (Imundo,
Arb.).
200. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 90, 92-93 (1996) (Frost, Arb.).
201. Steelcraft Mfg., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1798, 1801-02 (2016) (Miles, Arb.).
202. Id.
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medical documentation.203 Even though one employer’s policy requiring
certain documentation was reasonable, the arbitrator found a lack of just
cause based on the specific circumstances regarding his access to medical
care and the employer’s failure to give him a date certain when
documentation would be necessary to avoid discharge.204 The award
reinstated the grievant effective the date he was able to return to work. But
where a grievant has clearly failed to follow the requisite procedures related
to use of leave, a just cause protection in a CBA will not save him.205 These
employees likely would have failed to succeed in a similar claim under the
ADA or FMLA because their failure to adhere to procedural requirements
would have constituted legitimate reasons for their discharges.
In line with these more employee-beneficial awards, several arbitrators
have sustained grievances of employees seeking a transfer as an
accommodation under contractual rights to seek such a transfer.206 For
example, an employer was required to reinstate an employee whose
impairment prevented the performance of his normal duties because the CBA
allowed for termination of the seniority of an employee out on injury after
36 months.207 The arbitrator concluded that the same period of time should
apply to the employer’s contractual obligation to provide light duty work.208
Contractual obligations can also help to sustain a grievance, albeit not
for a lack of just cause. For example, an arbitrator sustained the grievance
of an employee whose partial incapacity prevented his performance of his
previous position because the employer failed to justify its refusal to place
him in another position under a CBA provision requiring “retrogression.”209
203. Employer[Ohio] & UFCW, 200581-AAA, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1841 (2016)
(Goldberg, Arb.); Interstate Brands Corp., 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 428, 431 (2010)
(Fitzsimmons, Arb.).
204. Employer[Ohio] & UFCW, 200581-AAA, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1847. But
see Citgo, 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 114, 132-33 (2014) (Jennings, Arb.) (finding just cause
for discharging employee who failed to provide medical documentation regarding his ability
to return to work).
205. Whirlpool Corp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1569, 1573 (2006) (Petersen, Arb.)
(finding no reason for employee’s failure to follow process).
206. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 140, 145 (2000) (Riker, Arb.);
L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 733, 739-40 (1999) (Kaufman, Arb.)
(approving transfer to a position occupied by part time employee); Johns Hopkins Bayview
Med. Ctr., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 198 (1995) (Bowers, Arb.) (explaining that
reassignment for on-the-job training would have been reasonable accommodation in lieu of
discharge); Kenai Borough Emps. Assoc., 1995 LA Supp. 116269 (1995) (Landau, Arb.);
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1039, 1044 (1993) (Lipson,
Arb.) (deciding employee to be placed at “any work he can do”).
207. Tecumseh Box Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 94 (1999) (Duff, Arb.).
208. Id. at 96.
209. Penelec First Energy Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1238 (2014) (Miles, Arb.); see
also Techneglass, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 727-28 (explaining that CBA required
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The arbitrator did not treat this situation as a discharge for cause, but instead
analyzed the employer’s contractual obligation to continue the employment
of anyone who is partially incapacitated and for whom a vacancy does not
exist.210 This grievant clearly benefitted not from just cause protection, but
from specific contractual language which had been applied to other
employees in the past.211 Of note is one arbitrator’s comment that the
contractual requirement to find suitable work for an employee whose
disability prevents performance of his previous duties was a “broader
obligation” than required by the ADA.212
The weakness of arbitration as a means to advance the rights of
employees with disabilities arises when the employee cannot rely on any
contractual language to support her request for an accommodation which
would have prevented the discharge. For example, where a CBA does not
require transfer, arbitrators often dismiss grievances on behalf of employees
who are no longer able to perform their work, without requiring that the
employer consider a transfer as an accommodation.213 In one case, the
arbitrator allowed the employer to justify her discharge because the
employee could no longer perform the essential duties of her previous
position, but failed to require that the employer consider a transfer before
discharging for just cause.214 Similarly, a second arbitrator relied on the
ADA’s limitation on the duty to transfer to vacant positions215 to conclude
that an employer was not obligated to bump employees with less seniority
who held positions that the grievant could perform, where the CBA’s
seniority provision only applied to layoffs.216 A third arbitrator explained
that the employer had just cause to discharge an employee who failed to
return to a position he could no longer perform, despite the existence of a
“job vacancy request” program, because the grievant had failed to initiate a

placement of employee with impairment “on other work if possible”).
210. Penelec First Energy Co., 133 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1245-46.
211. Id. at 1246-47; see also Warren, Ohio Sheriff’s Office, 128 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
787, 800 (2010) (Bell, Arb.) (finding grievant entitled to light duty assignment under the
CBA).
212. Techneglass, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 728.
213. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1759, 1766 (2015) (Das, Arb.);
Parkersburg Bedding, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1788, 1792 (2003) (Zobrak, Arb.).
214. Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 1048.
215. See, e.g., White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that the ADA does not require an employer to promote, reassign, or create a new position for
a disabled employee).
216. Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 545, 555-56 (1997)
(Weckstein, Arb.); see also Henkel Corp., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1121, 1126 (1998)
(West, Arb.) (requiring a transfer in violation of the seniority rights of others could impose
undue hardship).
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request for a transfer as required by the CBA.217 The arbitrator dismissed
any implication that the employer was responsible for initiating a transfer as
an accommodation,218 in contrast to some ADA decisions which place some
obligation on the employer to provide access to transfers as an
accommodation if the employer is aware that the employee with a disability
can no longer perform the duties of his previous position.219
Some arbitrators do not reach the question of a statutory duty to
accommodate where the employee has been discharged or kept on leave
based on an inability to perform the duties of her previous position. For
example, an arbitrator dismissed the grievance of a Red Cross employee who
could no longer work around certain equipment, where the CBA included no
duty to accommodate by transferring her to another position.220 At the same
time, the arbitrator noted that the employer still had “an obligation to act
reasonably and to afford a work accommodation if this can be accomplished
within the Collective Bargaining Agreement and with the past practice of the
parties.”221
Similarly, an employer had just cause to discharge an employee after
disability leave of 24 months (provided under the CBA), without considering
him for a transfer to a position he could perform, because the CBA did not
“demand” such a transfer, without any consideration of the ADA’s duty to
accommodate.222 It is interesting to note that a transfer to a position outside
of its bargaining unit could be viewed as an unreasonable accommodation.
One arbitrator failed to support a union’s argument to this effect,223 and a
second determined that such a transfer would be a reasonable
accommodation because the grievant could perform the duties.224
These awards demonstrate that where the CBA limits the authority of
the arbitrator to an interpretation of the CBA, an arbitrator may rely on
general principles to resolve the dispute. Where a specific contract provision
applies to an employee’s conduct, however, the arbitrator is likely to apply
that provision without consideration of any additional rights available under
the ADA. While this approach might appear to undermine employees’ rights
under the ADA, the outcome is consistent with ADA decisions which deny
accommodations based on deference to an employer’s policies, such as a
seniority system which can override a request for a transfer as an
217. AT&T Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 275, 276-77, 281 (2015)
(Nicholas, Arb.).
218. Id. at 281.
219. Hickox, supra note 170, at 206-10.
220. Am. Red Cross, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1441, 1445 (2006) (McDonald, Arb.).
221. Id.
222. Safeway Corp., 2008 Lab. Arb. Rep. Supp. (BNA) 119039 (2008) (Wages, Arb.).
223. Id.
224. Maint. & Indus. Servs., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 293, 299 (2001) (Hart, Arb.).
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accommodation225 or an employer’s leave policies.226
3. Employer’s Interests
Even if a CBA or employer policy does not specifically address an
employer’s interests in discharging an employee, the second principle of just
analysis asks whether the company’s rule or managerial order is reasonably
related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company’s
business and (b) the performance that the company might properly expect of
the employee.227 This approach allows an arbitrator to consider an
employer’s overall best interests in reviewing a discharge, even if the
employee has not violated a specific policy of provision of a CBA.
One could argue that if the prohibition has not been adopted in policy
or negotiated as part of a CBA, then an employer should not benefit from
such a general presumption in its favor. But one can also argue that this
general recognition of employers’ interests is balanced by the countervailing
recognition of mitigating circumstances which can result in the reversal of
an employee’s discharge, as discussed in the following section.
Issues of ability to perform often raise the question of what
accommodations are reasonable or required by contract. For example, a
hospital was not required to accommodate one employee by using a different
disinfectant because of the potential adverse effects on other employees and
patients, as well as ease of use and overall cost.228 It should be noted that
findings of just cause based on the duties of the position may be inconsistent
with the ADA’s obligation to remove unessential job duties229 or transfer into
a vacant position as reasonable accommodations, discussed below.230
Arbitrators commonly uphold an employer’s determination that an
employee can no longer perform her job duties, and that removal of those
duties should not be required.231 Experts have noted that an arbitrator
balances the right of an employee with a disability to work and “the
employer’s right to manage the business efficiently.”232 An employer is not
required under the ADA to remove essential job duties from a position, or

225. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
226. Hickox & Guzman, supra note 182, at 467-70.
227. Enter. Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 363.
228. S. Peninsula Hosp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 679-80 (2004) (Landau, Arb.).
229. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that a firefighter’s fire suppression duties were not essential for all other positions in the fire
department).
230. Hickox, supra note 170, at 197-200.
231. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 425-26.
232. Id. at 426.
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assign another person to perform those duties as an accommodation.233
Relying on both regulations and case law under the ADA, an arbitrator
refused to require that Bowater remove duties involving certain tools which
the grievant could not use, because removal of essential duties is not required
under the ADA.234
On the question of reasonableness and undue hardship, the employer’s
temporary reassignment of essential duties does not establish that such a
reassignment is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,235 because
employers should not be “punished” by requiring as accommodation some
change that it undertook voluntarily.236 The Bowater arbitrator relied on such
reasoning to find that the employer had just cause to discharge the employee
who had been excused from performing certain essential duties on a
temporary basis.237
Arbitrators have declined to require removal of essential duties even
without relying on the ADA. For example, an employer demonstrated just
cause to discharge an employee with a lifting restriction who could not
performed regularly assigned duties without assistance, despite his argument
that the lifting duties were “few and infrequent.”238 Instead, the arbitrator
accepted without question the employer’s position that lifting was an
essential part of that position, particularly where the grievant was offered

233. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2016); see, e.g., Basith v. Cook Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the employer did not discriminate against the grievant by not
assigning essential job functions to other employees); Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247,
1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the mere fact others could do an employee’s work
does not show that work is nonessential); Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 102
F.3d 1075, 1076 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that an accommodation eliminating the essential
functions of a job is not reasonable); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding that the employer was not required to reallocate job duties so as to change the
content, nature, or functions of the job).
234. Bowater, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382, 386-87 (2001) (Harris, Arb.); see also
Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 555 (holding that an engineer’s
essential job functions, requiring kneeling, bending, and lifting, did not need to be adjusted
by the employer).
235. See Lucas v. W. W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the employer was not required to reassign employee to another position to reasonably
accommodate the employee’s injury); see also Terrell v. U.S. Air, 132 F.3d 621, 625 (11th
Cir. 1998) (finding that the employer had no duty to create light duty positions to
accommodate an employee’s disability).
236. See Basith, 241 F.3d at 929-30 (citing Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin.,
44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995)) (holding that employers must not be punished for
accommodations); see also Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir.
1997) (observing that employers should not be discouraged from doing more than ADA
requires).
237. Bowater, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 389.
238. Maint. & Indus. Servs., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 298.
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help with lifting in another position.239 The arbitrator also concluded that
“redesign[ing]” positions was not a reasonable accommodation.240
Arbitrators have likewise recognized general employer interests in
addressing the claims of employees who were discharged because they posed
a threat in the workplace. One arbitrator, for example, concluded that an
employer had just cause for the discharge of an employee who only
threatened to become violent, reasoning that “[n]o employer is required to
wait until the level of violence is reached,” because “the co-workers’ quality
of life was seriously impacted as was the productivity of the plant.”241
Arbitrators have been criticized in their responses to employees who
engage in workplace violence, under the reasoning that employers should
have the right to decide that they will not tolerate any threatening or violent
employee behavior in the workplace.242 Just cause analysis can be applied
to undermine discipline for violence if committed as an act of self-defense,
the grievant lacked knowledge of employers’ policies which prohibited his
behavior, or the subsequent investigation was flawed.243 Consequently,
some grievants with disabilities may benefit from careful just cause analysis
despite an employer’s assertion that she poses a threat. For example, one
employer lacked just cause to discharge an employee who repeatedly
contacted a coworker outside of work after a psychotic break.244 Relying
heavily on the need for nexus between the conduct and the work to rely on
off duty conduct as the basis for discharge, the employer failed to establish
that the grievant’s actions had any effect on the employer.245 The arbitrator
explained that “[m]ere surmise, conjecture or speculation as to the adverse
effect upon its operations or its business because of the nature per se of the

239. Id. at 299.
240. Id.
241. See Anchor Hocking, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 319-20 (holding that an
employer’s discharge of a schizophrenic employee who threatened co-workers did not violate
the ADA); see also E.B. Eddy Paper, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1821, 1824 (2006) (Allen,
Arb.) (finding employer had just cause to discharge employee who told the supervisor “I wish
I had a gun with unlimited bullets to start dropping people one by one.”); Anchorage Sch.
Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1313, 1320-21 (2004) (DiFalco, Arb.) (upholding the
discharge of a grievant who was a “time bomb” ready to go off after threatening to kill others);
San Diego Trolley, 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 323, 327 (1999) (Prayzich, Arb.) (holding that
the employer had just cause to discharge grievant who possessed a gun in his locker in
violation of a no weapons rule to protect safety of employees).
242. See Daniel V. Johns, Action Should Follow Words: Assessing the Arbitral Response
to Zero-Tolerance Workplace Violence Policies, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 264-65
(2009) (arguing that an employer’s zero-tolerance workplace violence policy should be given
deference by arbitrators to address the serious issue of workplace violence).
243. Id. at 271-72, 274, 279.
244. Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 649, 652 (2015) (Riker, Arb.).
245. Id.
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alleged misconduct, is insufficient” to establish just cause.246
Arbitrators show some inclination to require actual harm to justify the
discharge of an employee with a disability. For example, an employer lacked
just cause to discharge an employee with paranoid schizophrenia who had
told his psychiatrist that he had thoughts of hurting people at work, but never
threatened anyone at work in his twelve years of service there.247 The
arbitrator reinstated the employee and allowed him to remain on leave until
the time that a medical professional determined it was safe for him to return
to work.248 Similarly, Walt Disney World lacked just cause to discharge an
employee for threatening a co-worker via voice-mail under its zero tolerance
policy, where mitigating circumstances were not considered.249
Arbitrators will also respect the resolution of previous incidents of
discipline which the employer has negotiated to its future advantage. For
example, an arbitrator enforced a last chance agreement when an employee
with a disability reported to work two hours late when she overslept because
of her prescribed medication.250 The arbitrator concluded that the grievant
need not be offered the opportunity to use vacation time to cover the absence,
where she had not formally requested an accommodation related to her
previous absences that had resulted in the last chance agreement, even
though use of her vacation time would have been an excused absence.251 The
arbitrator concluded that, where a last chance agreement is in place, the only
question is whether the grievant violated that agreement.252
These decisions demonstrate that while some arbitrators may recognize
some broader employer interests in applying just cause principles, the
employer may still need to establish some logical or concrete basis for its
discharge of a particular grievant. These outcomes may reflect the
underlying burden on the employer to establish just cause, even where some
broad employer interest may support its decision to discharge.

246. Id. (citing KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 149); see also City of Indianapolis, 118
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 357, 362 (2003) (Kohn, Arb.) (holding that the employer lacked just
cause to discharge the grievant based on an anonymous phone call accusing the employee of
smoking marijuana in a city vehicle because, in part, “mere suspicion is not enough to justify
a discharge”).
247. Save Mart Supermarkets, 126 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1018, 1022 (2009) (Riker,
Arb.).
248. Id.
249. Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 354-55.
250. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 895, 899 (2016) (Miles, Arb.).
251. Id. at 903-04.
252. Id. at 904.
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4. Mitigating Circumstances
Arbitrators typically consider a variety of mitigating factors related to
the individual grievant when considering whether the employer’s decision to
discharge was justified.253 In claims by employees with disabilities,
mitigating factors can include the person’s disability, which may have
contributed to the behavior that provided the reason for the discharge.
Related to the person’s disability, an arbitrator may consider the potential for
improvement in the employee’s condition or progress in rehabilitation. In
addition, arbitrators consider other individual factors which mitigate against
the employee’s discharge, such as longevity and a good performance record.
This consideration of the surrounding circumstances and the positive
characteristics of the employee with a disability contrasts starkly with ADA
analysis, which only considers whether the employee was otherwise
qualified for the position or provided the employer with a legitimate reason
for the discharge.254
An individual grievant’s past performance often results in a finding that
an employer lacked just cause for a discharge. Insubordination, while a
common reason for discharge, may not be sufficient to justify a discharge,
particularly where the grievant had no prior misconduct over a long tenure
with the employer, and the conduct was related to an illness or impairment.255
For example, a grocery store failed to show just cause to discharge a bagger
with bipolar disorder who was accused of using profanity toward his
manager256 The discharge was not fair and reasonable under the “proper
cause” clause of the CBA, based on the grievant’s potential for rehabilitation,
his 14 years of employment there, and the absence of any threat to safety of
employees or customers.257
Mitigating measures also may be considered in determining whether an
employer had just cause to discharge an employee based on his inability to
meet performance expectations. For example, repeated errors justified the
suspension, but not the discharge, of a grievant with a long job tenure who
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder related to his military service
and was the victim of workplace harassment.258 Similarly, an employer
lacked good cause to discharge a 20-year employee whose performance
issues were caused at least in part by a lack of training and his impairment
253. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 496-500.
254. See, e.g., Newell v. Alden Vill. Health Facility for Children & Young Adults, 651
F.App’x. 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiff was not qualified to perform essential
job duties because she could not perform the essential functions of the position).
255. Polar Tank Trailer, 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 406, 410 (2012) (Fitzsimmons, Arb.).
256. Schnucks Mkts., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1087 (2012) (Gear, Arb.).
257. Id. at 1089-90.
258. Lafarge Corp., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1188, 1192 (2000) (Liebowitz, Arb.).
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that warranted his assignment to light duty.259
An employee with health issues may benefit from mitigating
circumstances even where that employee has engaged in some misconduct.
For example, three different employers lacked just cause to discharge
employees who unintentionally fell asleep on the job.260 The first arbitrator
relied on a finding of no just cause in favor of another grievant who fell
asleep on the job when suffering from anxiety attacks.261 One arbitrator
considered the grievant’s record of very little past discipline over thirty-one
years with the employer,262 while another considered the grievant’s eighteen
years without discipline and the post-discharge diagnosis connected to
falling asleep.263
Similarly, arbitrators will sometimes consider mitigating factors to
conclude that the employer lacked just cause for a discharge based on
attendance. One arbitrator opined that the justification for discharging an
employee after some period of leave depended upon several factors,
including his tenure, whether the leave was caused by a workplace injury or
illness, the “cost of the employee’s absence . . . to the employer (in terms of
dollars and efficiency),” as well as the past and anticipated length of the
absence.264 Under these criteria, the arbitrator reinstated the grievant with an
opportunity to establish his ability to work within four weeks, based on his
twenty-two years of service and overall good performance.265
A disability may be viewed as a mitigating factor for a grievant who
engages in misconduct, such as two different grievants with depression who
were given the opportunity for reinstatement despite becoming violent with
coworkers,266 a grievant who could not be terminated for insubordinate
259. Johnson Controls Battery Grp., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 769, 773-74 (1999)
(Cantor, Arb.).
260. Ga. Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 481, 491-93 (Smith, Arb. 2010); Union
Tank Car Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (2007) (Dilts, Arb.); Sponge Cushion, Inc.,
114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 467, 470-471 (2000) (Gordinier, Arb.); see also, U.S. Foodservice,
120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 737 (2004) (Scholtz, Arb.) (finding a lack of just cause to
discharge based on DUI while on leave).
261. Sponge Cushion, Inc., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 470-471.
262. Georgia Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 491-93.
263. Union Tank Car Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1477-78 (modifying discharge to
suspension without pay for nine and one-half months); see also SMG, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1239, 1242 (2003) (Goldberg, Arb.) (reinstating grievant without back pay based on
medical condition contributing to misconduct, citing his long and successful tenure); Health
Plus Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 618, 621 (1998) (Duff, Arb.) (finding no just cause to
suspend employee of twenty-three years based on taking break related to impairment).
264. 148860-AAA, Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 148860 (2012) (Grossman, Arb.); see
also Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 124 (finding no duty to keep
position open indefinitely under “arbitral law”).
265. 148860-AAA, supra note 262.
266. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 292 (1995) (Giblin, Arb.)
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behavior because behavior was due to depression,267 and the grievant whose
threat to take unjustified medical leave was “probably” a manifestation of
her mental illness.268 Similarly, a grievant’s undiagnosed herniated disc was
treated as a mitigating factor to reduce his discharge to a thirty day
suspension based on some unsafe behavior and his use of profanity at
work.269 The arbitrator recognized that pain can cause “temporary
personality changes” and that the employer’s failure to refer the grievant for
a medical examination before the incident was at least a partial cause of the
outburst.270
Similarly, three different employers lacked just cause to discharge
employees for absenteeism which was directly linked to their mental
illnesses, based on medical evidence presented to establish the connection
between the impairments and the absences.271 Some arbitrators may even
accept evidence from non-medical sources to justify a grievant’s absence.272
As with one’s inability to perform job duties, an impairment may only be a
mitigating factor with regard to absenteeism if the employer has knowledge
of it before imposing discipline.273
Just cause analysis can likewise benefit an employee discharged for
tardiness or absenteeism.274 Recognizing an employer’s right to discharge
for failure to meet essential job duties, including regular attendance, one
(highlighting that employer lacked all the facts); Bethlehem Structural Prods. Corp., 106 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 452, 455-56 (1995) (Witt, Arb.) (finding that the assault was the result of
grievant’s depression).
267. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 305-06 (finding that employee
who was not warned he must continue treatment for depression to stay employed cannot be
terminated for insubordinate behavior due to his untreated disability).
268. Carrier Corp., 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 308, 311-12 (2014) (Heekin, Arb.).
269. Gaylord Container Corp., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 431, 435 (1996) (Henner,
Arb.).
270. Id.
271. Interstate Power & Light Co., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 307, 311 (2005) (Daly,
Arb.); LTV Steel Mining Co., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 283, 288 (1997) (Doepken, Arb.)
(finding no just cause to discharge grievant on last chance agreement where absenteeism was
due to change in medication, and ordering grievant’s return to active employment “upon
presentation of satisfactory evidence that he is medically fit to return to work”); USS, 104
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 82, 85-86 (1994) (Dybeck, Arb.) (finding no just cause for discharge
where grievant missed work to attend appointment with psychologist, despite last chance
agreement).
272. Cumberland Coal, 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 988, 993-94 (2016) (Miles, Arb.)
(citing prior arbitration awards).
273. OmniSource Corp., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 818, 821 (2011) (Coyne, Arb.).
274. See, e.g., Kautex Textron, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 746, 749 (2007) (Brunner,
Arb.) (finding that employer lacked just cause where attendance didn’t justify discharge under
employer’s policy); Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 545 (2005) (Abrams, Arb.)
(finding that grievant’s illness undercut finding that grievant was either unwilling or unable
to meet attendance obligations).
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arbitrator found a lack of just cause under a requirement that the employee
must be either unwilling or unable to meet attendance obligations in the
future.275 Thus, absences related to the symptoms of an employee’s medical
impairment may not show just cause.276
Conversely, arbitrators may consider but are not necessarily persuaded
by a grievant’s illness or injury as a mitigating factor, such as the grievant
whose illness was aggravated by the stress he encountered at work on the
day he left without permission.277 Likewise, the personality disorders which
admittedly contributed to the misconduct of three different grievants’
misconduct at work did not undermine the employers’ just cause for
discharging them.278 One of those arbitrators explained that “[a]n employer
is not required to keep in its employ a worker who is so disabled as to
demonstrate incapacity to consistently carry out required job.”279
A disability also may not be a mitigating factor if it is not linked to the
grievant’s misconduct. For example, an arbitrator considered but was not
persuaded by a grievant’s disability in finding just cause for her discharge
because her use of racially offensive terms in an e-mail was not a
“spontaneous outburst” associated with her bi-polar disorder, particularly
where she had been warned against engaging in such behavior.280 A grievant
may be limited in relying on an impairment as a mitigating factor if the
employer was not so informed prior to imposing the discipline.281
Arbitrators also have the flexibility to consider mitigating factors
related to an employee’s misconduct, even if those facts were unknown to
the employer at the time of the discharge. For example, the arbitrator for the
grievance of an employee who experienced a psychotic break considered his
mental state as a mitigating factor, and concluded that “[i]f a full
investigation had been undertaken by the Employer this matter may well
have enlightened management of the fact that the Grievant was a tormented
human being who needed help.”282 The grievant was reinstated but under a
275. Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 549.
276. Id. at 550.
277. NAES Corp., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 1709.
278. Beckett Paper Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1139; Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 4, 9 (1996) (Ross, Arb.); Rohm & Haas, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 974,
977-78 (1995) (Koenig, Arb.).
279. Nat’l Linen Supply, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 9.
280. M T Detroit, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1777, 1782 (2003) (Allen, Arb.).
281. Monongalia Cty. Coal Co., 136 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 135.
282. Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 653 (citing Elkouri & Elkouri,
supra note 42, at 814-15); see also Growmark Inc., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 785, 788
(1993) (Ver Ploeg, Arb.) (holding that grievant’s hospitalization for psychiatric counseling
explained failure to request leave); Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 112,
116 (1991) (Madden, Arb.) (finding no just cause where grievant could not perform duties
because of his health); Norman Brand & Melissa Biren, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN
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last chance agreement with several conditions to guard against any further
inappropriate contact with the coworker.283
In contrast to these awards in which a grievant’s disability may work in
her favor to disprove just cause, a court reviewing an ADA challenge to a
discharge will limit its analysis to whether the employer had a legitimate
reason for the discharge and whether that reason was a pretext for
discrimination.284 This requires a plaintiff to present evidence which
contradicts the facts relied upon by the employer,285 and to avoid a motion
for summary judgment, the court must find that a reasonable jury could
disbelieve the employer’s articulated non-discriminatory reason.286
Nowhere in this analysis does the court require that an employer consider
other circumstances or characteristics of the employee that would weigh
against the decision to discharge. Instead, courts have consistently refused
to act as “super-personnel departments” to prevent employers from
discharging people with disabilities even for reasons related to their
disability.287
Grievants who allegedly pose a direct threat also benefit in arbitration
from evidence of a lessening of the symptoms of their impairment or
rehabilitation following their discharge.
Experts have noted that
rehabilitation can be a persuasive, if not determinative, factor mitigating
against discharge as the appropriate response to the conduct of an employee
with a disability.288 For example, a grievant with a mental illness was
reinstated, despite her employer’s claims that she posed a direct threat, where
her behavior improved substantially, due to successful therapy, after
discharge. 289 That arbitrator noted “numerous” awards, some preceding the
passage of the ADA, in which arbitrators considered the post-discharge
improvement of the grievant’s mental state as a mitigating factor in favor of
awarding reinstatement.290 As a condition of her reinstatement on a
ARBITRATION (BNA, 2nd ed. 2008).
283. Chevron Prods. Co., 135 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 654.
284. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (finding that once
the employer had supplied legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for demotion and discharge,
the presumption of discrimination had been rebutted and the burden shifted to the employee
to ultimately prove that reasoning was pretext for discrimination); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that employee had failed to show that both the employer’s
given reasons for non-discriminatory action were untrue and that discrimination was true
reason behind action).
285. Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006).
286. Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 430 (3d Cir. 2013).
287. Ramona L. Paetzold, How Courts, Employers, and the ADA Disable Persons with
Bipolar Disorder, 9 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 293, 373-374 (2005).
288. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 424-25.
289. AAFES Distribution, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 290, 296 (1996) (Marcus, Arb.).
290. Id. (citing USS, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 82; Meijer, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep.
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probationary basis, the grievant was ordered to continue with her treatment
and agree to a release of her treatment records to the employer.291 In contrast,
a grievant’s failure to demonstrate rehabilitation may undermine his
grievance. For example, an arbitrator refused to reinstate an employee
discharged for alcoholism, in part because the employee had failed to
continue with regular counseling and took a job as a bartender after his
discharge.292
Arbitrators have also been criticized for considering other mitigating
factors when determining whether a grievant posed a direct threat in the
workplace.293 For example, an employee who had slapped a coworker was
reinstated based on his supervisor’s provision of a positive reference letter
and a request that he work extra hours after the incident took place.294
Decisions under the ADA concerning whether an employee poses a
direct threat only consider whether the employer reasonably believed that the
plaintiff posed a direct threat in the workplace at the time of the discharge;
proof of an actual threat is unnecessary.295 An employee will only survive a
motion for summary judgment if he can produce evidence that raises
questions of fact as to whether he posed a threat at the time of the
discharge.296 In contrast, arbitrators often consider subsequent facts or
circumstances that might undermine the employer’s determination that the
employee did pose a direct threat.
5. Flexibility in Remedies
A significant difference between arbitration and litigation under the
ADA is the availability of a variety of remedies. Arbitrators typically follow

(BNA) 834; Duquesne Light Co., 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 696 (1988) (Probst, Arb.); UC
Agric. Prods. Co., Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 432 (1987) (Anderson, Arb.)).
291. Id. at 297.
292. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1466, 1472 (2000)
(Goldstein, Arb.); see also Packaging Corp. of Am., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 591, 594-95
(1995) (Hewitt, Arb.) (finding that an employee with delayed stress reaction could not
establish that the problem that caused misconduct was corrected).
293. Johns, supra note 240, at 280-81.
294. Sodexho Mgmt., Inc., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1643, 1647-48 (2007) (Kaufman,
Arb.).
295. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that an
employer reasonably believed there was a direct threat posed by an employee with worsening
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder given the nature and severity of the potential
risk, the likelihood that the potential harm would occur, and the imminence of the potential
harm).
296. See, e.g., McFadden v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 204 F. Supp. 3d 134, 14547 (D.D.C. 2016) (explaining the procedural standard for responding to a motion for summary
judgment).
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the tenet that one should not substitute his judgment regarding discipline for
that of management unless the penalty of discharge was excessive,
unreasonable or that management abused its discretion.297 At the same time,
if an employer’s policy does not go further and state which circumstances
might justify discipline less than a discharge, or even no discipline, an
arbitrator must apply common sense, past practice, company and industry
standards, and societal standards to determine whether and to what extent a
particular disciplinary decision is justified.298
The penalty imposed by an arbitrator can depend on the employer’s past
practice, including the discharge of the grievant as compared to how the
employer has previously punished other employees.299 In one study of over
2,000 discipline and discharge arbitration awards between 1982 and 2005,
almost 30% were classified as “split decisions,” including reinstatement with
partial or no back pay, or entitlement to a future vacancy.300 Four hundred
and fifty-four awards reduced the level of discipline under just cause
analysis, based on one or more mitigating factors.301 The most common
mitigating factors relied upon were the punishment being too severe for the
offense, a good work record, a lack of progressive discipline, and length of
service.302
Under the limited judicial review of arbitration awards discussed
earlier, an arbitrator is free to reduce the punishment imposed, despite some
violation of a clear employer policy, if employees were not previously aware
that discharge could result from a violation of that policy.303 As one court
explained, “the general practice among arbitrators is to consider just cause
when assessing the degree of discipline imposed.”304 This support for finding
an implied just cause requirement extends to the degree of discipline
imposed by the employer.305
Reinstatement without full back pay is common where the grievant is
somehow deemed to be “at fault” even though the employer lacked just cause
for discharge.306 For example, an employer lacked just cause to discharge an
297. Franz Food Prods., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 543, 548 (1953) (Bothwell, Arb.).
298. ST. ANTOINE, supra note 37, at 185.
299. KOVEN & SMITH, supra note 23, at 20.
300. Cooper, supra note 92, at 429.
301. Id. at 420.
302. Id. at 420.
303. See, e.g., Gloucester Terminals, LLC v. Teamsters Local Union 929, No. 16-5322,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77486 at *13-19 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2017).
304. SFIC Props., 103 F.3d at 925.
305. Charter Commc’s, LLC v. Int’l Bro. of Elec. Workers, 602 F.App’x 654, 655 (9th
Cir. 2015).
306. See, e.g., Hilltop Basic Res., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 861, 864-65 (1993) (Krislov,
Arb.) (holding that grievant’s suspension was justified in part by his failure to obtain
physician’s certificate allowing return to work).
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employee who fell asleep during his paid break, but the arbitrator still denied
back pay because the grievant had failed to get treatment for his condition
which led to the incident.307
Similarly, a Meijer cashier was reinstated to a position without
customer contact after making rude statements to a customer, which were
attributed to his bipolar disorder.308 Although the mental illness did
contribute to the misconduct, the arbitrator found some cause for discipline
because the grievant’s failure to seek treatment caused the misconduct, and
that failure could not have been accommodated. This conclusion failed to
consider a potential duty to provide leave as an accommodation under the
ADA, as the union had suggested. Even so, the arbitrator reinstated the
grievant (without back pay) based on his determination that the penalty of
discharge was inappropriate, given the employer’s knowledge of the
disability and the relationship between the disability and the misconduct, as
well as his long years of service.309 Thus, in essence, the award provided the
employee with a period of unpaid leave as a quasi-accommodation for the
period of time in which he failed to seek treatment. This outcome likely
placed the employee in a better position than he would have been in under
the ADA, since his failure to receive treatment likely would have rendered
him unqualified at the time of the discharge,310 thereby undermining the
ADA claim.
Unlike courts, arbitrators can dictate prospective relief that can result in
the grievant’s reinstatement while still addressing employers’ concerns. For
example, one arbitrator reinstated an employee with bipolar disorder who
had engaged in misconduct, but imposed a suspension without pay until the
employee met certain conditions indicating his readiness to return to work
with his behavior under control.311 Similarly, employers of grievants with
mental illnesses have been allowed by the arbitrator to condition future
employment on receipt of treatment and/or the taking of medication (which
in one case was found to have contributed to alleged insubordination).312
Similarly, an award reinstating the grievant still gave the employer the
opportunity to require assurance from the grievant’s doctor that he was on
307. EG & G Mound Applied Techs., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60, 64 (1993) (Heekin,
Arb.); see also Hosp. Klean of Tex., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 985, 994 (2004) (Howell,
Arb.) (denying back pay for grievant who used impairment as excuse to avoid working).
308. Meijer Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 839-40.
309. Id. at 840.
310. See, e.g., Green v. Burton Rubber Processing, Inc., 30 F. App’x 466, 468-70 (6th
Cir. 2002) (ruling that an employee who left treatment facility after making threats was not
qualified for position).
311. Schnucks Mkts., 131 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1090-91.
312. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 306; Gen. Elec. Co., 103 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 214, 218-19 (1994) (Cabe, Arb.).
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proper medication to control his panic attacks.313 An arbitrator’s flexibility
likewise is demonstrated by remedies that include requiring an independent,
neutral medical evaluation of a grievant to determine his ability to meet the
physical demands of the position in question.314
Unlike an ADA court, an arbitrator has the flexibility to condition a
remedy on information only available in the future. For example,
reinstatement as a remedy can be conditioned on the results of a future
medical examination to determine whether the grievant is fit to return to
work.315 Other arbitrators have ordered the parties to meet and discuss a
grievant’s ability to return to work, with the availability of future arbitration
if they are unable to agree.316 One arbitrator explained that the grievant
should only be returned to work if the parties agreed on a “solid basis on
which to conclude that his medical condition no longer poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.”317
An even more extensive remedy was created by an arbitrator upon
hearing the grievance of a discharged government employee whose assault
on a coworker was closely connected to the symptoms of his disability.318 In
addition to converting the discharge to a suspension of no more than ninety
days with the associated back pay, the award allowed the employer to place
the grievant on a last chance agreement (despite EEOC concerns regarding
last chance agreements as accommodations), access his relevant medical
records and agree to a treatment plan based on the recommendations of the
grievant’s doctor (including monitoring to ensure adherence to medication
regimen), as well as reassigning him to a different unit to avoid stressors and
“for personnel relations reasons.”319
Like employees who engage in misconduct, a just cause provision may
benefit a person with a disability who cannot meet her employer’s
performance expectations. For example, an employer lacked just cause to
discharge an employee with diabetes that contributed to his low
productivity.320 While the performance standards were reasonable and
313. Ga. Power Co., 129 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 494; see also Cross Oil Refining Co.,
111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1013, 1024 (1999) (Bumpass, Arb.) (stating that an employer can
require either proof of mental and emotional fitness by psychologist or psychiatrist or
retraining with counselor).
314. Noranda Aluminum, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 222; see also The Ohio Moulding
Corp., 1996 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 117047 (Klein, Arb.) (explaining that the discharge
lacks just cause if medical opinion finds that grievant could perform the vacant position).
315. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 292.
316. Bethlehem Structural Prods. Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 456.
317. Id. at 456.
318. Dept. of Commerce, Patent & Trademark Office, 1999 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp.
107763 (Moore, Arb.).
319. Id.
320. Sysco Food Servs., 130 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1724 (2012) (Paolucci, Arb.).
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allowed under the CBA’s management rights clause, the employer should
have taken the employee’s disability into account in determining what level
of discipline should have been imposed.321 This arbitrator returned the
grievant to work with no loss of seniority, but without back pay because of
“his own culpability” in failing to treat his condition and advise his
supervisors of his impairment’s impact on his productivity.322 At the same
time, back pay may be denied for employees who have engaged in some
misconduct for which the arbitrator finds suspension or some other loss of
pay to be appropriate.323
In contrast to these arbitration awards, which provide employees with
alternatives to discharge, a court reviewing an ADA claim will only
determine whether or not the discharge constituted discrimination; if not, no
remedy is awarded. An arbitrator’s flexibility in considering mitigating
factors and fashioning remedies for employees with disabilities who have
been discharged may be the single most important factor in their regaining
employment. Such flexibility allows the arbitrator to recognize the interests
of the employer in imposing some type of discipline, such as a suspension
without pay, while allowing for the reinstatement of employees whose
discharge may be the result of an impairment over which she has little control
or which may not continue to affect performance or behavior in the future.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the benefits of just cause protection for employees with
disabilities demonstrates that arbitrators, if empowered to do so, can fully
and fairly resolve claims that would otherwise arise under the ADA. This
analysis supports courts’ deference to arbitration as the forum to enforce
statutory rights as well as contractual rights,324 despite warnings that
arbitration of statutory claims would result in the evisceration of rights under
statutes like the ADA.325 Thus, arbitration of just cause claims by employees
with disabilities shows the viability of arbitration as an alternative venue to
321. Id. at 1738.
322. Id. at 1739; see also Walt Disney World, 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 357 (allowing
an employee to be reinstated after alleged threatening of coworker but denying back pay
because he “did wrong that day”); Am. Airlines, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 550 (2005)
(reinstating an employee who was absent due to symptoms of impairment but without back
pay, because he was partially at fault for circumstances including failure to file FMLA
paperwork); Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1192 (reinstating an
employee who should have been offered transfer as accommodation without back pay,
pending agreement re: placement).
323. See, e.g., Albertson’s Inc., 1993 LAB. ARB. SUPP. (BNA) 102592 (Sherman, Arb.
1993) (holding that leave without pay was justified).
324. 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 270-74.
325. Hyde, supra note 5, at 984.
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resolve discrimination claims. Grievants with disabilities appear to fare at
least as well, if not better, compared to analogous claims resolved by the
courts under the ADA.
Just cause protection places on the employer the burden of proving
some legitimate reason for the employee’s discharge, which can carry
serious advantages for an employee with a disability who may lack access to
concrete information to support her claim under the ADA. But beyond the
burden of proof, arbitration of just cause claims incorporates the requirement
that an employee be provided with notice of required and prohibited
behavior, and provides the benefit (or the burden) of an employer’s past
practice in enforcing such policies. An employee with a disability can also
take advantage of other contractual obligations on an employer in deciding
whether her discharge was justified. While some courts applying the ADA
consider related contractual rights, they are not directly obligated to do so.
Beyond specific contractual requirements, an arbitrator often considers
mitigating circumstances which can benefit the employee with a disability,
particularly if those circumstances demonstrate that the employee was not
“at fault” in her conduct. An arbitrator’s flexibility in fashioning the
remedies in an award interpreting a just cause provision can also benefit
employees with disabilities. As an alternative to discharge, a suspension
without pay or even an obligation to provide additional medical information
may be a welcome outcome.
Arbitration may not be perfect, and outcomes often depend on the
authority an arbitrator is given under a collective bargaining agreement.
Even so, this forum provides an opportunity for employees with disabilities
to challenge employer assumptions about their value in the workplace. They
may gain reinstatement, even in situations which would not result in a similar
outcome in ADA litigation. With proper oversight of the arbitration process
and vigorous representation by the employee’s union or outside counsel, just
cause protection may be the best route to improving the participation and
retention of employees with disabilities in the workplace.

